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GO WORLD

Summer 1991 NO.64

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
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The Cover: The Nine Old Men of Incense Mountain

by William Pinckard

A commemorative *surimono* (a type of elaborate print made for private distribution) with metallic pigments privately published ca. 1823 by Gakutei for a group of *kyōka* poets known as the Katsushika Circle. This is one of an unusual set of prints on the theme announced as *Meisu Juban*, 'Ten Famous Numbers' (given in the cartouche printed in red in the upper right corner), this one being, of course, the number nine. The title, to the left of the cartouche, is *Kozan Kyūro*, 'The Nine Old Men of Incense Mountain'. The two *kyōka* poems are:

*Crayfish and
White-hairs are playing a ko;
in Horai
youthful spring defers
to old age.
— Matsukaze Nokicho*

*Black hair-oil
they apply to recover
their youth;
on a spring day the snow
on old men's heads disappears.
— Matsumune Chieda*

'Crayfish' is a complimentary epithet for old age because, though it appears whiskery and hunched, its flesh is sweet. A *ko* is a special situation in go where a stone can be captured and recaptured almost endlessly, thus making time stand still, as it were (*ko* is also the Japanese term for the Buddhist *kalpa*). Horai is the Japanese equivalent of the Isles of the Blest, a place where people remain forever young.

The two poems maintain an interesting balance between the ideas of Horai and Japan, winter and spring, age and youth, white and black — ultimately, Yin and Yang. In the first poem spring waits until the old men have concluded their game, the suggestion being that in this way White achieves a victory over Black. In the second, the scales tip the other way: white hairs regain their youthful color, indication that Black wins.

Incense Mountain in the title of this print is Hsiang-shan, near the old capital of Loyang in China, where the great T'ang poet Po Chū-i built a retreat in which to entertain eight of his friends. By alluding to them, the 'Nine Old Men' of the title becomes a graceful compliment to members of the Katsushika Club, intimating that they, too, perhaps rank with such immortals.

Po Chū-i's poems were immensely popular in Japan; his Collected Works were being read there even during his lifetime. This print, in which the shapes of the old men and their garments seem to melt into the dappled lights and shadows of the design, could aptly serve as an illustration to the following often-quoted poem by Po:

*Mountain monks sit playing go.
Over the board is the bamboo's lucent shade.
No one sees them through the glittering leaves,
But now and then is heard the click of a stone.*

Gakutei, who designed the print, was not only an artist but also a scholar and essayist. He is said to have been especially fond of Chinese literature.

(From the Ishi Press Collection)

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Go World News

International News

4th Fujitsu Cup Fizzles out in Forfeits

The main go event of the summer in Japan is the final of the Fujitsu Cup, which, together with the playoff for 3rd place, was scheduled for 3 August this year.

On the morning of 3 August, the Yomiuri announced that Cho Chikun was the new Fujitsu World Champion. The other finalist, Qian Yuping of China, had been hospitalized and was unable to come to Japan for the final. This was not the first time Qian's career has been interrupted by illness. After becoming one of the Chinese representatives, he had had to miss the 1st Fujitsu Cup in 1988.

There is no provision for a default like this in the tournament rules, so Cho Chikun had to go to the tournament venue at 10 a.m. on the 3rd. A player loses on time if he is 30 minutes or more late, so Cho was declared the winner at 10:30. As far as we know, this is the first time that a player has forfeited a title final since Sekiyama Riichi fell ill during the 2nd Honinbo title match in 1943.

The forfeit was, of course, quite a blow to the sponsors and the go press, but more was to come. The playoff for 3rd place between O Rissei and Kobayashi Koichi was scheduled to be played at the same time as the final, but by 10:30 Kobayashi Koichi had not made an appearance, so O Rissei was declared the winner of their match. Two forfeits taking place on the same day is an astonishing coincidence. It turned out that Kobayashi had fallen ill the day before, running a temperature of over 40 degrees.

To update the report in our previous issue, the results in the quarterfinals and finals are given below.

Quarterfinals (Beijing, 1 June). Cho Chikun defeated Ma Xiaochun, O Rissei d. Michael Redmond, Kobayashi Koichi d. Suh Bongseo, Qian Yuping d. Ishida Yoshio.

Semifinals (Osaka, 6 July). Cho d. O Rissei, Qian d. Kobayashi.

Kobayashi's loss to Qian was his first ever

to a Chinese player other than Nie. It made his record against Chinese players 24-3. Kobayashi was perhaps handicapped by having to play the semifinal just two days after the 5th game, which he lost, of the Honinbo title match.

Rin v. Lee in Final of 3rd Tongyang Securities Cup

The semifinals of this Korean-sponsored international tournament were held in Seoul on 13, 15, and 17 June. Rin Kaiho, representing Chinese Taipei, defeated Cho Chikun, playing for Korea, 2-0. In the all-Korean semifinal, Lee Changho triumphed 2-1 over his teacher, Cho Hun-hyun. The best-of-five final between Rin and Lee will be played in autumn in Taipei (the first two games) and Seoul.



This year Rin Kaiho failed to do well in the Fujitsu Cup for the first time, but he is keeping his flag flying in other international matches.

Rin Defeats Nie in Japan-China Tengen Playoff

After one day's rest back in Tokyo, Rin Kaiho flew to China to meet Nie Weiping in the 4th Japan-China Tengen playoff. In contrast to its failures in the Super Go, Japan has won every one of the three Tengen and three Meijin playoffs played to date with China.

This year, for the first time, Nie was the Chinese representative, so Japan was expected to have a tougher time.

It did look as if China's turn had finally come when Nie started off with an easy win in the first game (played on 21 June). This was actually his first win in four games to date with Rin. However, Rin fought back to take the second and third games (23, 25 June), so once again China's ambitions were thwarted.



Kataoka stops the 6th Super Go from turning into a rout.

Japan Recovers in 6th Super Go

Thanks to the efforts of Kataoka Satoshi 9-dan, Japan has recovered from its bad start to even the 6th Super Go series 3-all. He matched the achievement of Zheng Hong, a new star for China, who started with wins over Komatsu Hideki (22 March), Ogata Masaki (24 March), and Yoda Norimoto (27 May). Kataoka defeated Zheng on 29 May (the last two games were played in Japan), then continued by beating Liao Guiyong 7-dan (3 July) and Liang Weitang 7-dan (5 July) in China. His next opponent is Zhang Wendong, a former WAGC champion who recently won promotion to 8-dan.

Japan's First Defeat on a China Tour

This year a team of young Japanese players touring China in the 19th Japan-China Go Exchange suffered the first defeat ever by a Japanese touring team. The team of eight

players, all under 26 and 8-dan, was only able to win 20 games in the eight matches it played on the tour, which lasted from 21 May to 5 June. It suffered 35 losses and one game was declared no-result. Usually touring teams have an advantage, perhaps because of the team spirit that is built up during a tour, and the Chinese win in Japan and vice versa. The 1991 tour was the first exception for Japan. This is the third year in a row that both sides have restricted their teams to junior players, and the result seems to be yet another indication that the younger generation of Japanese players may be falling behind their Chinese counterparts.



Moriama 7-dan: his perfect slate was the only bright spot for Japan on a disappointing tour.

The one consolation for the Japanese was the outstanding performance of their 'captain', Moriama Naoki 7-dan of the Kansai Ki-in. Moriama, aged 25, became the third Japanese player, after Hashimoto Shoji and Kobayashi Koichi, to win all seven of his games on a tour of China.

Apart from Moriama, only two players had a plus record: Nakaonoda 5-dan with 4-3 and Ryu Shikun 4-dan (a Korean member of the Nihon Ki-in) with 4-2-1 no result.

Incidentally, an additional criterion for the five male players on the Japanese team was that they all be winners of Kisei dan championships. The two women players were both title holders: Sakakibara Fumiko, who is

Women's Kakusei, and Nakazawa Ayako, Women's Honinbo. The average age of the team was just under 20.

To oppose them, the Chinese fielded a total of 34 players under 29 and 8-dan. They included two 13-year-olds, both of whom defeated Nakazawa. One can't help wondering what the balance of power in the go world is going to look like in ten or 15 years, when these young Chinese players mature and the current generation of Japanese title-holders passes its peak.

No IBM Tournament This Year

Readers may be wondering why there have been no reports on the IBM Lightning Go Championship this year. The answer, unfortunately, is that this international tournament has been discontinued by the sponsor.

News from Japan

Cho Defends Honinbo Title

Once again Cho Chikun seemed to be in bad trouble in defending his Honinbo title. Kobayashi Koichi, the challenger for the second year in a row, made a good start by winning the first two games, but then he fell

victim to yet another tenacious fightback by Cho. The latter won four games in a row to take his fifth Honinbo title.

Cho started the series with some strange fuseki play that came in for severe criticism from fellow professionals, but from the third game on he recovered and was his usual brilliant self. In contrast, Kobayashi was the one whose play seemed to suffer from the pressure in the latter part of the series, and his form was erratic and inconsistent. In the 5th game, he experimented with an uncharacteristic large moyo that Cho had no trouble chewing up from the inside. In the sixth game, within sight of an upset win that would have evened the series, he made a blunder of a kind he'd never made before. 'I don't know what came over me,' he lamented after the game. Just what the blunder was we hope to be able to show you in our next issue.

Full results:

- Game 1 (10, 11 May). Kobayashi (W) by resig.
Game 2 (27, 28 May). Kobayashi (B) by 4 1/2 points.
Game 3 (7, 8 June). Cho (B) by 10 1/2 points.
Game 4 (27, 28 June). Cho (W) by 5 1/2 points.
Game 5 (3, 4 July). Cho (B) by 3 1/2 points.
Game 6 (17, 18 July). Cho (W) by resig.



The 46th Honinbo title match followed what has become the familiar pattern for Cho defences. Cho starts off by losing a couple of games to put himself under pressure, then, with his back to the wall, he reels off a series of wins. Like last year, Kobayashi took a two-game lead, but once again he found it wasn't enough.

16th Meijin League (as of 2 July 1991) Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Player	O	T	C	A	R	Y	F	I	M	Score
1	Otake	—	0	0	0	0	1	0	1		2 — 5
2	Takemiya	1	—	1	1	0		0	1	1	5 — 2
3	Cho Chikun	1	0	—		0	0	1	1	1	4 — 3
4	Awaji	1	0		—	0	0	0	0	1	2 — 5
5	Rin Kaiho	1	1	1	1	—	1	1		1	7 — 0
6	Yoda	0		1	1	0	—	1	1	0	4 — 3
7	Fujisawa S.	1	1	0	1	0	0	—	0	1	4 — 4
7	Ishii K.	0	0	0	1		0	1	—	0	2 — 5
7	Mimura		0	0	0	0	1	0	1	—	2 — 5

Note: The players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Rin to Challenge Kobayashi Meijin

Although one round still has to be played, Rin Kaiho has already earned the right to challenge Kobayashi Koichi for the 16th Meijin title, as he is two points clear of the field. This will be the first best-of-seven between these two players. Rin will be a dangerous opponent for Kobayashi: he has won the only previous title match between them, the 1990 Tengen.

47th Honinbo League: Two Debuts and a Comeback

On the same day that Cho defended his title, a former world amateur go champion earned the right to make his debut in the Honinbo league. After winning the 8th WAGC in 1986 as the Hong Kong representative, Chan Ka Yui 7-dan became a 5-dan professional at the Kansai Ki-in. He has since advanced to 7-dan and now, at the age of 36, he is making his bid to join the top group of professionals. This was his third serious attempt to get into the league; last year he lost to Komatsu Hideki in the semifinal of the preliminary round and the year before that to Sakata in the final.

The second player making his debut is also from the Kansai Ki-in. He is Imamura Toshiya, aged 25, who is the leading young player in Osaka. He defeated Kudo Norio 9-dan in the preliminary final on 1 August. The latter was hoping to make a comeback after a 12-year absence from the league.

Joining Chan and Imamura is Kato Masao, regaining his place after missing two leagues. Kato defeated former Honinbo challenger

Awaji in the playoff.

The fourth vacant place in the league will go to the winner of the game between Komatsu Hideki, who was eliminated in the previous league, and Yuki Satoshi 7-dan, yet another Kansai Ki-in player. If Yuki, aged 19, wins a place, the Kansai Ki-in will match its record, set three times, of having three players in the same league.

Kobayashi Koichi Leads in Gosei Title

For the second year in a row, the Gosei title match is featuring a clash between the two Kobayashis, Koichi and Satoru. Last year it was a wipe-out, with the senior Kobayashi defending his title with three straight wins. This year Satoru's challenge looked like meeting the same fate when Koichi won the first two games, but finally, on his sixth attempt, Satoru was able to pick up a win. This brought to an end an eight-game winning streak by Koichi in Gosei title games.

Results to date:

Game 1 (11 July). Koichi (W) by 7 1/2 points.

Game 2 (22 July). Koichi (B) by resig.

Game 3 (31 July). Satoru (B) by resig.

Ohira Wins 9-dan Section of 16th Kisei

Winning the 9-dan section of the Kisei tournament is said to be as difficult as winning a title. The competition is 71 9-dans from the Nihon Ki-in and Kansai Ki-in. Of course, the top current title holders are seeded into the second part of the Kisei tournament, but even so there are a lot of strong players to over-

come. This year Ohira Shuzo 9-dan was victorious, winning his second 9-dan championship. In the final, played on 11 July, he defeated Kiyonari Tetsuya of the Kansai Ki-in.

The 8-dan section was won by O Meien and the 7-dan section by Moriyama Naoki.

17th Tengen Progress

Yamashiro Hiroshi has won his way to the playoff to decide the Tengen challenger. In the semifinal he defeated three-time challenger Sonoda Yuichi. His opponent in the playoff will be the winner of the semifinal between O Rissei and Kato Masao.

39th Oza Progress

Pairings in the semifinals are Kataoka Satoshi v. Kobayashi Koichi and Hashimoto Shoji v. Fujisawa Shuko.

Hans Pietsch in the Insei League

In the 'Go Topics, Go Trivia' column in GW63, we forgot to include Hans Pietsch of Germany in the list of Westerners studying as inseis at the Nihon Ki-in. We would like to remedy the omission by noting that he is actually doing the best of the overseas apprentice professionals. In July he was promoted to the top class, A class, and though he dropped back to B this month, he has a chance of winning a place in the tournament for promotion to professional shodan.

Obituaries

Shimamura Toshihiro

We regret to have to report the death of Shimamura Toshihiro on 21 June 1991 of acute pneumonia. He was aged 79.

Shimamura suffered a stroke during a Meijin league game on 11 March 1982. He recovered sufficiently to play teaching games, but was completely paralysed by another stroke in January 1985.

Born on 18 April 1912, Shimamura was at his peak in the 1950's, when he twice challenged for the Honinbo title. He was unsuccessful, losing to Takagawa Honinbo, but throughout his career he won a total of 15 titles, including the Oza title and the NHK Cup. His outstanding achievement was winning the 3rd Tengen title in 1977, at the age of 65. This is

still a record for the highest age at which anyone has won an open title.

Shimamura was known for his patient, waiting style. A popular nickname for his quiet, somber style was *ibushi-gin* or 'oxidized silver' (it loses something in the translation).



The late Shimamura Toshihiro

In 1966 Shimamura led a tour of China by a group of Japanese professionals. He had good results, with five wins, no losses, and one *jigo*, but the tour is more important for a souvenir he brought back. He 're-imported' into Japan an opening invented by Yasunaga Hajime that had become popular among Chinese professionals. Nowadays it is known as the 'Chinese opening', but initially in Japan it was called the 'Shimamura opening'.

Shimamura was the leading player of the Central Japan branch of the Nihon Ki-in. He trained many disciples, including Hane and Yamashiro.

Kitani Miharuru

Kitani Miharuru, the wife of the late Kitani Minoru, died on 3 June 1991 at the age of 81. Known as 'the mother of the go world', Kitani acted as parent to several generations of go players who as children were taken into the Kitani household for intensive training. She was closer to many of them than their real mothers.

Continued on page 51

The 4th Fujitsu Cup

As reported in our news section, Cho Chikun won the 4th Fujitsu Cup by a forfeit when his opponent Qian fell ill just before the final. In this issue we would like to present two interesting games from the first round. The first shows one of the

favourites, two-time champion Takemiya, meeting with an unexpected reverse, and the second features a move that the winner said he would remember all his life.



Takemiya (left) runs into a tough opponent in the first round.

Round 1: Takemiya v. Ma

'I want to play for my country in Beijing.' This was Ma's refrain in press interviews while he was in Japan for the first two rounds of the Fujitsu Cup. That meant winning two games, yet in the first round he was paired against one of the favourites, Takemiya Masaki, whom Fujisawa Shuko had tipped to win the tournament.

These two had played each other twice before, with Takemiya losing in their 3rd Japan-China Super Go game in February 1988 and winning in the 2nd round of the 1st Cup (the game is given in GW52) in June of the same year.

Ma failed to make the Chinese squad for the 3rd Fujitsu Cup, but this time he took first place in the Chinese qualifying tournament. He is 26 years old and holds the Mingren title.

White: Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China)

Black: Takemiya Masaki 9-dan (Japan)

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 3 hours each.

Played on 6 April 1991 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Figure 1 (1-43). A strong extension

The fuseki to 20 is the same as in this year's Meijin-league game between Otake and Takemiya. The latter was impressed with how knowledgeable Ma was about Japanese go.

White 34 is a good move: this extension has an inhibiting effect on Black's moyo potential below. However, Black 35 is also a good point, so both sides are satisfied.

White 38 is slack. Takemiya was happy to see Ma connect submissively: he would have disliked having White make the A-B exchange before 38.

When Black expands his moyo with 41, invading at 42 is essential. If instead White defends the left side with C, he can't invade

the bottom after Black D.

Black 43. Exchanging E for White F would be the usual approach, but the momentum of 41 leads Takemiya to attack at 43.




Figure 1 (1-43)





Figure 2 (44-72)



Dia. 1

Figure 2 (44-72). Unlike Takemiya?

Black 45 leads to a trade, with Black taking profit and White building thickness. The

Japanese professionals following the game in the pressroom were surprised by this sequence, commenting that it was unlike Takemiya.

Takemiya: 'Perhaps I could also have followed *Dia. 1*, but I thought that building thickness when White has poked his head out at the top [at 34 in Figure 1] would have been too inflexible and obstinate. In this position I believe that going for profit is natural.'

Black 55 was the first move Takemiya regretted. He played thickly because he didn't want White to jump to this point, but 55 was slack. White has the placement at 72 and the link-up of A, so the value of the bottom area is small. Instead of 55, extending to 58 was the most urgent move.

Ma seizes the opportunity to make territory on the left side with 56 to 70.




Figure 3 (73-115)

Figure 3 (73-115). Both can't be right.

Rin Kaiho gave a public commentary at the Nihon Ki-in while the 1st-round games were being played. His assessment of the game was at odds with Takemiya's. Referring to the position around 100, Rin said: 'The game looks close. This type of game is Ma's forte.' Takemiya: 'Black has a big lead after 113. He's probably 15 points ahead on the board.' The reader will have to choose whether to believe Rin or Takemiya: both can't be right. It's certainly true that Takemiya is known for his optimism and Ma is quite respectable at the endgame.





Figure 4 (116-160)



Dia. 2

Figure 4 (116-160). Takemiya's misreading

Capturing a stone with 21 is Takemiya's first misstep. Takemiya: 'Black 21 was awful. The game would have been over if I had enclosed territory with the ordinary moves of 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*. This way Black would be ahead by the size of his bottom right territory.'

White 22 is an emergency measure: it shows that Ma believed that he was behind.

Black 23 was Takemiya's slowest move of the game. Takemiya: 'When White played that bad-looking move, I felt that I had to punish it and decide the game. I thought for about 30 minutes.'

Black 25. Black 26-White 30-Black A would also be good, but Takemiya chose to attack on a large scale. However, he had made a misreading: he thought that he could capture White by playing 33 at 36.

Black has to switch course with 33. Up to 39 he picks up three stones. After the game Ma said to Takemiya (in Japanese): 'Capturing the

three stones was small.' Even so, the game is not yet bad for Black. The really bad move is 43 in response to the peep. Instead, Black must connect at 52 or push up at 50.

White 46 to 52 gave Black a jolt. He has no choice but to connect at 53, letting White capture a stone with 54. 'My play around here was unbelievably bad,' said Takemiya. In retrospect, Black could still have made a game of it if he had pulled back at 49 instead of 47.




Figure 5 (161-200)




Figure 6 (201-256)

39: at 37; 46: at 33; 55: above 52

Figures 5 & 6

In the brief discussion after the game Takemiya maintained that Black had been

ahead and Ma agreed. Later Takemiya commented to the Yomiuri reporter: 'Ma must have been surprised to win this game.'

Fujisawa Shuko had nominated Takemiya as the favourite for the 4th Cup, yet for the second year in a row he had failed to win a game. His performance was quite a contrast to the first two Cups.

Fortunately for Takemiya, his setback didn't affect his play in the Judan title match. At this point he was trailing Cho 1-2, but he rallied to take the next two games and defend the title.

Ma went on to defeat the Korean prodigy Lee Changho in the second round and realize his ambition of representing his country in the third round in Beijing, but there his luck ran out. One day he is going to live up to his promise in an international tournament, but fans are still waiting.

Black resigns after White 256.

(Adapted from the Yomiuri)

Round 1: O Rissei v. Liu

This game features a spectacular combination by O Rissei (born 1958), a player who in

recent years has become one of the stars of TV tournaments in Japan. He has invented a number of new moves in some complicated josekis and he likes to spring them on opponents in TV games in which they don't have much time to work out refutations. This strategy paid off for him in the 11th Kakusei Cup, which he won in 1989. Some of his innovations have won general acceptance among professionals. Last year he represented Chinese Taipei in the 3rd Cup and defeated Sakata Eio in the first round, but then lost to Rin Kaiho in the second. This was his first game ever with a mainland Chinese player.

His opponent, Liu Xiaoguang, has been established as one of the top Chinese players for several years now. Born in March 1960, he won the Chinese Individual Championship in 1980, followed by the National Championship in 1986, the 1st and 3rd Tianyuan and the 1st Mingren titles. He is known for his fighting prowess. In the 2nd Cup he defeated Yang 6-dan of Korea and Cho Chikun, playing for Japan, then lost to Takemiya.

The commentary is from a series in *Kido* in which Kato Masao responds to questions posed by amateur players.



The game between Liu (right) and O gets under way.

White: O Rissei 9-dan

Black: Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan

Played on 6 April 1991 at the Nihon Ki-in.

Commentary by Kato 9-dan.






Figure 1 (1-12)



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Figure 1 (1-12). Vying for the initiative


Q: Are White 8 and 10 a joseki? White 12 is another move I haven't seen much . . .

White 8 and 10 are often played. I'd call them a standard fuseki pattern rather than a joseki. When 4 and 5 have been played in the bottom left corner and Black has pincer at 7, then fleeing with 6 will probably let Black seize the initiative. In contrast, 8 gives White the chance to take the initiative himself with the pincer of 10. In this case, White 8 is most often played at A, but of course no one can say

which is better.

The next thing to note about the 8-10 pattern is that blocking at B becomes urgent. Black has two options here. One is to block immediately at 1 in *Dia. 1*. But then attacking with 2 and 4 works really well for White, so you can say that Black has fallen in perfectly with White's wishes. Therefore, Black first jumps to 11 in the figure, intending to exchange this for White 1 in *Dia. 2* before switching to 2. Compared to *Dia. 1*, the potential severity of a white attack has been reduced.

I haven't seen White 12 before either — it's an O Rissei innovation. In response, Black could play the two-space high-pincer joseki from 1 to 17 in *Dia. 3*, but White would like this: he gets local thickness and sente to switch to 18.



Dia. 3

When I asked O Rissei about 12, he said: 'The image of *Dia. 3* came into my mind, and I thought it would be nice to get this result.'

Figure 2 (13-35). Black's sabaki a failure

Q: Please explain the meaning of 13 and 15. Which side has the better of it in the result to 35?

Things don't, of course, proceed the way O Rissei planned. But even so Liu was probably greatly perplexed by this unorthodox attack. It gives you a shock when the opponent plays a new move like this — you wonder if he's already completely researched it.

The first move to be considered for 13 is the belly contact play of 1 in *Dia. 4*. This is also a two-space high-pincer variation. However, if

Black hanes at 5 after 2 to 4, White blocks at 6 and gets such a big corner territory that the result is uninteresting for Black. For that reason, Black will want to resist with 5 at 1 in *Dia. 5*. If White counters by cutting at 2, Black continues with 3 to 7. He may end in gote, but descending at 'a' will be sente and he has weakened the two white stones above, so this wouldn't be a bad result.






Figure 2 (13-35)




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Consequently, White will not cut at 2 in *Dia. 5*, but will fight strongly with 2 in *Dia. 6*. The fight from 3 to 6 can be expected, but there is no telling how this will end up. It's not unplayable for Black, but when you bear in mind the possibility that White has already researched all the variations, you tend to be-

come a little cautious. This cautiousness is manifested in 13 and 15, but, to give the conclusion, the exchange up to 16 strengthens White, so it is very bad for Black. Simply settling his group up to 33 leaves Black feeling very dissatisfied.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Among the professionals following the game in the pressroom the opinion was expressed that the shoulder hit of 1 in *Dia. 7* might have been a good strategy. Black attaches at 3 after first making White crawl at 2. If this happens, then Black gets a much more comfortable shape than in *Dia. 6*. Note that it will be easier for Black to move out into the centre, as pushing up at 'a' will be sente.

Even though Black gets sente to block at 35, White has already taken an early lead.

Life and Death Problem

Nakayama Noriyuki



Black to play

Take advantage of White's shortage of liberties.
Answer on page 15.





Figure 3 (36-63)
50: connects; 63: connects



Dia. 8


Figure 3 (36-63). Squeezing feels good, but . . .

Q: The way Black jumps to 37 before squeezing is instructive. I would atari immediately at 42. Can you tell us what difference it makes to extend at 57 instead of 56?


First, playing an atari at 1 in Dia. 8 would be a terrible *aji-keshi* move, because Black has the *aji* of cutting at 2 or playing a sente move at 'a' or 'b'. Moreover, the marked black stones are floating in space, and Black 1 makes no contribution to stabilizing them. When Black keeps 1 in reserve, it won't hurt him if White plays another stone in this area. White is hardly likely to push up against these light stones with White 1. That would just make Black 'a' a good move.

Well, you express admiration for Black's squeeze with 37 to 43, but actually 37 is a slack move. Even though Black squeezes with 41 to 49, Black's thickness has no function to perform in this position. Instead of 37, Black A on the right side would have been bigger.

If White uses 56 to extend at 1 in Dia. 9, the moves to 7 follow, and the difference from the game is that White ends in gote. Of course, his thickness in Dia. 9 is superior, but in this game taking sente is more profitable.



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

After the game O Rissei commented that taking the corner with 1 to 11 in Dia. 10 would have been better than blocking at 52. However, it is far from being clear which variation is better for White; what's certain is that either way he is ahead.




Figure 4 (64-98)


Figure 4 (64-98). Giving Black a chance

Q: Why doesn't White block at A instead of 70? There must be a lot of variations in the fight from 83 on.

In a sense, ignoring Black 69 is a manifestation of fighting spirit. More simply, White believes that turning at 70 is bigger.

White 82 is an overplay — if he had held back at B, there would have been no defect in his shape for Black to take advantage of. A

sharp player like Liu is not going to miss the chance to invade at 83. White played 82 because he was aiming at pulling out his stone at 78 later. O Rissei: 'I thought Black would defend at the top, but I was fooling myself.' There's no saying who will win now.



Dia. 11

White 84 makes slack shape. If he could, White would like to block at 1 in *Dia. 11*. Presumably O disliked the prospect of Black's breaking through the middle with 2 on. However, I don't believe this would be so bad for White if he made a hane at 'a' after 12. I think this variation would have been the most reasonable.

White 86. Extending at 87 would just help Black to extend to C.

Black 89. O: 'I was just thinking how nasty a move here would be when my opponent had a long think about it, then, sure enough, played right where I didn't want him to.'

Figure 5 (99–108). *Threatening a counterattack*

Q: I don't understand the play around here at all. Isn't Black going to have a tough time taking care of his group after White cuts at 102?

Black 99 is probably the losing move. Black is threatening to launch a counterattack against the bottom right white group, but after White 102 to 108 he is, as you suggest, having a hard time of it. Instead of 99, defending at 1 in *Dia. 12* would have kept the game even. If Black plays this way, White will start a fight at the top with 2 and 4. If the sequence to 9 followed, White would have to play 'a' to live, which would be painful. It would not be clear who had the lead.

Black 101. Black goes all out, declining to play the *honte* (proper move) of A.






Figure 5 (99–108)



Dia. 12

Answer to Life and Death Problem



Black 1 is the key move. White can't make a second eye after 7. If Black 1 at 3, White lives with 1.

(Go Weekly, 23 July 1991)





Figure 6 (109-130)
28: ko (at 20)



Dia. 13

Figure 6 (109-130). Black's threat on the outside

Q: I don't understand the meaning of the furikawari (swap) from 9 to 13. Couldn't White have found a more aggressive move for 10?

When you say 'more aggressive', if White uses 10 to block at A, then he will feel quite apprehensive when Black jumps to B. The real question is whether White can try to capture Black with 1 in Dia. 13. The problem is that Black can take profit on the outside with 2 to 6. This result would turn the marked black stone into a cleverly timed forcing move. Capturing three stones in good *aji* with 10 and 12 in the figure is far superior. White has once again taken the lead.

White 30 strikes at the vital point. Black is on the spot. O Rissei was very happy with 30, calling it 'a brilliancy that I'll remember all my life'.





Figure 7 (131-150)



Dia. 14

Figure 7 (131-150). Even living is not enough.

Q: Does Black really have no answer to White 30? Is the group on the right side dead after White 50?

If Black uses 31 to defend the cutting point of A, White will pull out his stone with a move to the right of 31. That would split Black into two groups, one of which would have to die.

If Black plays 31 at 32, White cuts at A: that is no good for Black. Black 31 is the strongest answer, but even so Black's position is in shreds after 32. The game is over once White has played 30 in Figure 6.

Black 33. If at 34, the top black group will be safe, but the one on the right will die after White connects at 33.

Black 35. If at 36, White captures two stones in sente as in Dia. 14. Black loses.

The best Black can do after White 50 is to

get the ko shown in *Dia. 15*. The game would be bad for Black even if he lived unconditionally, so resigning is natural. Note that White still has a ko on the top left with 'a'.


Black resigns after White 150.

(*Kido*, June 1991. Translated by John Power.)

It's unusual for a professional to praise his own moves, but 130 is an exception. O commented: 'I was really glad when I discovered this move.'

O Rissei has been having a great year. The first game he lost this year was on May 9, giving him a winning streak of 16 in a row (two of the games were played last year). As of July 26, his record was 24-3, which gives him a good chance of taking some of the *Kido* prizes

for 1991 (he will be very hard to beat for the successive-wins prizes). This one-sided victory over Liu certainly showed that he was enjoying good form.



Dia. 15

Invite a Shogi Master to Your Home!

For everyone who lacks dozens of shogi players living next door, Ishi Press is pleased to announce the new ***Shogi Master*** computer program for IBM PC and compatibles.

This program is perfect for new players: response time at the introductory level is almost immediate, and the outstanding full color VGA 640x400 graphics can display either traditional Japanese or international-style pieces at the touch of a key (EGA, CGA, Hercules & Tandy modes are also supported). Advanced players will find the higher levels challenging—*Shogi Master* can play at the 2 to 3 kyu level! You'll also enjoy *Shogi Master*'s ability to construct, record and solve problems. Record and playback your own and pro games too. *Shogi Master* will display commentary on file too.

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The 15th Kisei Title



Kato and Kobayashi shake hands before the start of the first game in Sao Paulo.

Kobayashi draws level with Shuko

This year's Kisei title match witnessed a spectacular fight between Kobayashi Koichi and Kato Masao and ended with Kobayashi drawing level with Fujisawa Shuko's great record by winning his sixth Kisei title in a row.

Considering that Kobayashi has been the in-form player of the last half decade, while the challenger Kato has been in a slump ever since he lost the Meijin title to Kobayashi in 1988, this was expected to be an easy defence for the latter. Moreover, though he won the right to challenge, Kato's play in the Kisei playoff, immediately preceding which he had lost his last remaining title, the Oza, had not been impressive, and he needed a bit of luck in scoring an upset victory over Kobayashi Satoru.

This was an important match for Kato. For the first time in his career he found himself reduced to the unadorned rank of 9-dan; the Kisei was the only title he hadn't won so far, so he had a chance of emulating Cho Chikun in completing a grand slam of the seven major titles; finally, he had already made two unsuc-

cessful challenges for the Kisei title.

When Kato challenged Kobayashi for the Kisei in 1988, he had been a strong favourite, as he had a big lead over him in personal encounters (35 wins to 19 losses, including three title-match wins to one loss), but he suffered a surprising 4–1 rebuff. That win must have bolstered Kobayashi's self-confidence quite a lot and spurred him on to take the Meijin title from Kato later in the same year. By the time of this Kisei match, Kobayashi had caught up to the tune of 31–39, which meant that in the preceding three years he had scored 12 wins to

13th–15th Kisei Prize Money

1st prize: ¥30,000,000

2nd prize: ¥6,000,000

Match fee. Title holder: ¥8,000,000

Challenger: ¥5,000,000

Prize for winning the playoff to decide the challenger: ¥2,900,000.

Kobayashi v. Kato in Title Matches

7th Tengen (1981). Kato Tengen defeated Kobayashi 3-2.

22nd Judan (1984). Kobayashi d. Kato Judan 3-2.

33rd Oza (1985). Kato Oza d. Kobayashi 3-0.

11th Meijin (1986). Kato d. Kobayashi Meijin 4-0.

25th Judan (1987). Kato d. Kobayashi Judan 3-1.

12th Kisei (1988). Kobayashi Kisei won 4-1.

13th Meijin (1988). Kobayashi d. Kato Meijin 4-1.

13th Gosei (1988). Kobayashi d. Kato Gosei 3-0.

15th Kisei (1991). Kobayashi Kisei won 4-3.

Kobayashi now leads 5-4 and has won four title matches in a row. These two have met in the finals of six of the seven titles, which is a record. The only one left is the Honinbo.

just four losses.

All these considerations seemed to become irrelevant once Kato became the challenger. His bad form didn't magically disappear — Kato was very dissatisfied with his play even in the games he won — but his fighting spirit made it irrelevant. He played with grim determination, however unfavourable the position, and the match became the first Kisei match in six years to go the full distance. Kato has always been known for his fighting strength, but what stood out in this series, especially in the first and sixth games, was his skill at *shinogi*, which is the art of rescuing groups under attack and in danger of dying. In the seventh game, he took the lead after a bad start and had reporters anticipating the birth of a new Kisei, but Kobayashi kept his cool and managed to stage an upset. This was undoubtedly Kobayashi's most arduous defence to date (obviously, since after taking the title 4-2 from Cho he made four 4-1 defences); the experience is bound to be a big plus for him as he sets his sights on Sakata's record of seven successive titles and then another one that has seemed all but unapproachable, Takagawa's nine in a row (both set in the Honinbo tournament).

Game One

White: Kobayashi Koichi Kisei, Meijin & Gosei

Black: Kato Masao 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Sao Paulo on 18, 19 January 1991.

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan.

The first game was played in Brazil, at the Caesar Park Hotel in Sao Paulo. The referee was Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan, who founded his first overseas go centre in this city. Iwamoto turned 89 just after the game, on 5 February. Playing title games overseas, in different time zones (this game started at 8 p.m. Japanese time), is quite a burden on the players, but Kobayashi commented that he felt he could hardly complain when Iwamoto was showing no signs of strain from the daylong trip from Japan. Iwamoto gets his energy from his drive to found more overseas go centres. He hopes to see centres established in Europe and North America while he is still healthy enough to visit them, but unfortunately current projects have become bogged down in the Nihon Ki-in bureaucracy.

Otake's commentary on the first game shows his concern with the psychological factors that play as much of a role as go technique in deciding the result of an important game.

Kisei Title Winners

1 (1977). Fujisawa Shuko defeated Hashimoto Uтаро 4-1.

2 (1978). Shuko d. Kato Masao 4-3.

3 (1979). Shuko d. Ishida Yoshio 4-1.

4 (1980). Shuko d. Rin Kaiho 4-1.

5 (1981). Shuko d. Otake Hideo 4-0.

6 (1982). Shuko d. Rin Kaiho 4-3.

7 (1983). Cho Chikun d. Shuko 4-3.

8 (1984). Cho d. Rin 4-2.

9 (1985). Cho d. Takemiya Masaki 4-3.

10 (1986). Kobayashi Koichi d. Cho 4-2.

11 (1987). Kobayashi d. Takemiya 4-1.

12 (1988). Kobayashi d. Kato 4-1.

13 (1989). Kobayashi d. Takemiya 4-1.

14 (1990). Kobayashi d. Otake 4-1.

15 (1991). Kobayashi d. Kato 4-3.

The long struggle between Kobayashi and Kato has begun. Last year I challenged Kobayashi in two best-of-sevens and had a terrible time, but even so it's nicer to be the challenger than a spectator. Unfortunately, I have to take a holiday this time and content myself with watching closely the performance of these junior Kitani disciples.

I was impressed by the speeches made by these two at the Kisei party held in Tokyo before they left for Sao Paulo.

Kato: When he made his two previous challenges, his opponents, Shuko and Kobayashi, both had just one title, the Kisei, whereas he had three or four. That made him take it too easy. But this time Kobayashi is the one with a handful of titles, whereas he has none. He can take the Kisei without being accused of greed.

Kobayashi's response: Somehow he has managed to split title matches 4-4 with Kato, but in all games against him to date he is behind. This is a good chance to catch up.

Speeches at functions like this are usually half sincere, half jesting, but I felt that they were both psyched up for the match. It should be an exciting series.

As you all know, Kobayashi's go is lucid and he bases his strategy on playing the most reasonable move in each position. He's very clever at judging what is reasonable, what is good enough.

Kato's go is, in a word, stubborn. Courageous. Once he makes up his mind, he pushes straight ahead. Stubbornness and courage — when things go right, his go is awesome. The other side of the coin is that he's too uncompromising. When things go badly, there's no stopping. Kato will absorb a lot of punishment rather than change his tactics.

Figure 1 (1-34). *Is it courage or . . .*

The first thing that impressed me on looking through this game was Kato's incredible patience. The way the game developed I thought that it would be very hard for Kobayashi to lose it, but Kato absorbed blow after blow without flinching. Perhaps because it was the first game. He played carefully, and patiently waited for his chance.

It's a game that makes you think.

Look at how Kato counters Kobayashi's invasion of 32 with his own invasion at 33. How does this strike the reader?

It's true that Black 33 is a courageous move, typical of Kato. However, I believe that actually the invasion of 32 put him on the spot, that he thought the position was far from easy for him.






Figure 1 (1-34)



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Instead of 33, the usual strategy would be to cap at A, but if White made twin contact plays at B and C, it's inconceivable that he would have any trouble settling his group. My guess is that Kato was forced to switch to 33 because he couldn't find any suitable counterattack against 32.

I can't believe that Black has made any actual bad moves, yet the position is bad for him: that shows you how difficult fuseki is. It's quite beyond me to suggest what he should have played, but let me refer to a turning point I noticed.

The pincer of 17 is positive, but playing Black D-White E-Black F would be more solid. Also, what about playing 17 immediately at 19?



Dia. 3

Next, if he could have got the result in *Dia. 1*, Kato would probably have played 21 at 1 there. However, in the past Kobayashi had countered Black 1 as in *Dia. 2*, and Kato didn't want this.

Might not the problem lie in the high extension of 27? If Black played more solidly with 1 in *Dia. 3*, White wouldn't have so many easy options when he invaded. Black 1 also sets up a good continuation at 'a'.





Figure 2 (35-40)

Figure 2 (35-40). Decoy invasion

The invasion of 33 in Figure 1 starts a fight at the top, but the presence of 32 is constantly on the mind of both players. Black could get a ko with 37 at 40, White A, Black B, but Kato has no intention whatsoever of playing a ko.


First of all, as the proverb indicates, there are no ko threats in the opening. Black 33 is bait to catch 32.

White 38 shows Kobayashi's concern for 32. He doesn't mind if his position at the top suffers a little damage. He maintains that the negative consequences for the heart of Black's position on the right side will be greater.




Dia. 4

How about extending at 40 instead of 38? If the sequence in *Dia. 4* follows, White's profit seems superior to Black's influence. Getting a cutting point at 'a' is unpleasant for Black. If he plays 2 in *Dia. 5*, profit and influence are reversed, but White becomes incredibly thick, so it can't be bad for him.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Kobayashi was probably afraid of *Dia. 6*. Black uses the two inside stones as decoys to set up a squeeze on the outside. Next, he plans to attack the solitary white stone on the right side. This result is just what Black wants. Note the aji of Black 'a', which can be exploited by cutting at 'b'. Kobayashi probably decided to go for safety-first.



Kato hands the sealed move to the referee, Iwamoto Kaoru.




Figure 3 (41–88)


Figure 3 (41–88). *Kobayashi is satisfied.*

Black seems to be doing well when he steamrollers his way out with the tesuji of 39 (Figure 2), then attacks with 53, but the fact of the matter is that this is not at all bad for White.

When White gets so much thickness at the top, the marked white stone (32) can throw its weight around. On top of that, the joseki at the bottom now looks good for White with 20

(Figure 1) poking its head out at the right place.

White 72 was the final move on the first day. Looking at this position, it seemed to me that Black was already out of the running. Kato's courage in invading at 33 had turned out badly for him.



Dia. 7

Black 73. Kato probably had a tough time deciding on this move. It's only too obvious that White can cut a swathe through his position with 76 on. Yet if Black sets up the *geta* in Dia. 7, White 2 and 4 work perfectly. I just can't find any good move for Black.

Kobayashi was probably very happy when he played 88. You want the bottom? Be my guest. I'll take the wider side, the bigger side: that's what White 88 is saying.




Figure 4 (89-120)

Figure 4 (89-120). *Pleasant thoughts*

I can imagine Kato muttering, 'Help yourself to the bottom, Kobayashi. Play your *kosumi* in the centre. Enjoy yourself.' I think that in this figure Kato was probably disgusted with his play. The Yomiuri reported that he was downcast after the game, saying: 'Naturally it's nicer to win than to lose, but playing like this is hopeless.' I can understand his feelings. If possible, I'm sure he would have liked to have slunk away immediately after the game.


White blocks at 100. He must have been ecstatic at being able to play a move like this in sente. At the risk of seeming tedious, let me repeat: the bottom is still small.

Is this the right time to force with 102 on? Well, let it pass. While playing on the left side, Kobayashi was probably having fun working out how he was going to carve up the right side. He was probably thinking with pleasure of the treat in store.

White rams into Black at 114, then jabs with 116. I can imagine the confident way Kobayashi placed the stones. You can see what he wants with 114. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 8*, White is quite ready to give him the single stone on the side and in its place accept the 12 marked stones. White can propose this outrageous trade because he has such an overwhelming superiority in this area.

White 116. Kobayashi can find moves like this immediately because he has been battle-hardened by the continuous fighting of the

last few years. White is just a little worried about the cut at A, so he wants to play 116 and 118 in sente. Next, he reinforces at 120: he has the wind in his sails.



Dia. 8



Abe 9-dan, Iwamoto and Ishida Yoshio can be seen studying the fuseki as the game gets under way.

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


Figure 5 (121-145)

Figure 5 (121-145). On the receiving end of a lot of punishment

In the previous figure Kato was on the receiving end of everything. He bore up grimly under the rain of blows. In this and the next figure he plays with the utmost resolution in seeking ways to rescue his groups. He plays patiently, concentrating on staying on his feet, resisting with all his might. And all the while awaiting a chance to counterattack.

This puts a lot of pressure on the attacker: time after time he positions his opponent for the knockout punch, only to see him scrape out of trouble each time. By the end of the next figure the game has not yet turned in Black's favour, but it's fair to say that his all-out resistance is what earns him ultimate victory.

Black can't afford to sacrifice any of his stones. He becomes extremely busy when he commences rescue operations with 21.

Looking at it from Kobayashi's side, he could probably have blocked at 37 instead of 32. The idea of White 37 would be to make Black look after his group here first and in the process get some help in attacking the black group above. However, White 32 is also a good move, so one is not necessarily justified in criticizing it. That's right — Kobayashi had so many good moves here that choosing among them must have been perplexing.

Black plays 35 and 37 to help the group below before linking up with 39.

Black 43 and 45 may seem to be the wrong area for Black to play, but threatening the eye shape of this white group helps in looking after the black group below. This is borne out by the continuation in the game.






Figure 6 (146-171)



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 6 (146-171). Kato saves all his groups.

When White attacks the group below with 46, Black plays a probe at 47. If White played 48 at 66, he could capture the black group, but Black's invasion at A would be very severe. To give one example —

Dia. 9. White 4 and 6 offer the strongest resistance, but Black will not docilely live with

7 at 'a'. That would be too good for White, giving him the connection of 'b'. Instead, he will most likely counterattack with 7 to 13. Next —

Dia. 10. If White tries to capture him with 1, 3 to 7 seem to prevent Black from linking up, but shortage of liberties means that he has no answer to Black 12. These two diagrams show only one possibility among many. If White compromised, he would be in no danger of dying, but compromising would be painful.

Kato sets about saving the right-side group with 49. The cut of 47 makes 53 and 55 sente. Black then takes a bite at White with 57 before living cleverly up to 71.

White can't omit 66 — if he does, Black B, White C, Black 66. You can see why Black played 43 and 45 in the previous figure.

The game has now calmed down, White has played a big move at 48 — the position is still favourable for him. Moreover, he has sente.




Figure 7 (172-230)


ko: 81, 84, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99, 102, 105, 120, 123, 126; 128: ko (at 76)

Figure 7 (172-230). Finally, the upset

Kobayashi now had to face another tough opponent: he went into *byo-yomi* on move 160. Already faced with stiff opposition from Kato, he now had a new fight on his hands. It's only natural if a player stops seeing moves under such pressure. Moreover, at times like this, when the game is favourable but you can't wrap it up, you become angry with yourself.

The opinion was expressed that it would have been simpler for White to play 72 at 73, making *miai* of 72 and A. But even 72 is good enough.


Black 75 was a sharp move, typical of Kato, but in retrospect you can say that nothing would have happened if White had used 80 to force at 1 in *Dia. 11*, then connected at 3. The idea of 4 is that Black threatens to play a ko later with White 15, Black 'a', but White has the clever move of 13. White lives unconditionally up to 17.



Dia. 11

The reason why Kobayashi lost was that he was cowed by Kato's fighting spirit into playing a ko with 80. The actual losing move was 112. Letting Black play such a big move as 113 in sente is unbearable.

Instead of 112, White had to follow *Dia. 12*. When he lets slip this sequence, his lead is upset.



Dia. 12

Figure 8 (231-304). A surprise from Kato

After playing most of the game with his head bowed, Kato finally saw his patience and persistence pay off: right at the end Fortune smiled on him. He owed his win to the unrelenting spirit of his play, which subjected Kobayashi to a lot of pressure. Kato's fortitude summoned victory to his side.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Kido, March 1991)



Kato scores an upset in the first game. Watching is Ishida Yoshio, the Yomiuri commentator. The consensus among professionals was that despite mistakes by both sides, this was a great game full of fighting spirit. Incidentally, at 304 moves, it was the longest game so far in a Kisei title match.

Game Two




Figure 8 (231–304)
 ko: 36, 39, 44; 45: connects at 40;
 46: connects (at 33); 82: connects (left of 66);
 103: connects (below 57).
 White wins and connects the ko.

White: Kato Masao
 Black: Kobayashi Koichi
 Played in Toyama City on 30, 31 January 1991.
 Commentary by Rin Kaiho Tengen.




Figure 1 (1–32)

Figure 1 (1–32). *Profit v. moyo*

The pattern from 1 to 5 is the current 'Kobayashi style'. Kobayashi has a number of these favourite patterns. If White plays 16 to the right of 17, Black will extend to A, another well-known Kobayashi pattern.

Kobayashi plays 17 because he doesn't feel like invading the corner immediately. The sequence to 23 is a joseki, but the joseki in which the stone at 16 is the extension at B is more common. The result here also looks equal. Black takes profit, but White is satisfied: the left side was not big for him, as Black can attach to the left of 8.

Black 31 is necessary: White C would be severe.

White 32 gives Black an obvious invasion point, as shown by his next move. White D instead would make it a little harder for Black to invade. (In Game Six of this series, Kato holds back one line with his extension.)








Figure 2 (33–52)

Figure 2 (33–52). *Kobayashi's new move*

Black 35 is a new move. It may seem to be deserting the battlefield, but the moment it appeared on the TV monitor in the pressroom Kojima 9-dan exclaimed: 'A ladder-maker!' Kobayashi had obviously researched this move, for he spent barely a minute on it. As the first highlight of the game, this position is worth analysing.

Dia. 1 and 2 show the standard invasion patterns (*Dia. 2* is a variation for 4 in *Dia. 1*). Each gives a reasonable game, but Kobayashi is

dissatisfied with these commonplace results. The point of 35 is that Black wants to wedge in at 2 in *Dia. 3*. The marked black stone now creates a ladder, so Black can capture the marked white stone. That's bad for White, so he will follow *Dia. 4*. Even so, this is an improvement for Black over *Dia. 1*, as White's shape has cutting points in it.


*Dia. 1**Dia. 2**Dia. 3**Dia. 4*

For the above reasons, White declines to answer 35, giving Black a second move at 37. The result may be reasonable for both. Kudo 9-dan, the Yomiuri commentator, said: 'The pattern to 34 has been played a number of times, but no one has ever played a ladder-maker at 35. You could call it a new move. You have to admire Kobayashi for his courage in playing such an original move in an important game.'


White 42 shows fighting spirit. White could be satisfied to connect at 1 in *Dia. 5*, but most

professionals would be tempted to extend at 42. Kobayashi said that he planned to enclose the left side with 2 and 4.

When White refuses to compromise, Black has to invade, as 42 makes the bottom area too big to cede it all to White. Black 43 is the key move — if at 44, White A would be a good answer.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Black 51 is a blunt move but is probably best. If White connects at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black has the 2-4 combination with which to settle his group. If White attacks with 'a' after Black 8, Black moves out with 'b'; if White seals Black in with 'c', Black lives with 'a', White 'd', Black 'e', which would be a slack result for White.

For such reasons, White emphasizes territory by taking a firm grip on the black stone with 52.

With the players about to plunge into the middle-game fighting, the first day's play ends. Neither side has yet taken a lead.

Figure 3 (53-72). *Both sides go all-out.*

Black cuts with 53 (the sealed move), then takes a giant step into the centre with 57. The

conservative one-space jump of 1 in *Dia. 7* would be very dubious, as it would just give White momentum for expanding his moyo with 2 and 4. This variation would probably be a loss for Black.





Figure 3 (53-72)




Dia. 7

Well, then, can't White break through the gap in Black's position? White could sever Black with 1 in *Dia. 8*, but the fruits of the attack would be disproportionate to the effort involved. Black would be satisfied with 2 to 8, but if White pushes along at 'a' instead of 7 Black simply hanes at 'b'. White won't be able to expand his moyo in the convenient fashion he does in *Dia. 7*. That's why he jumps to 58, letting Black reinforce with 59. However, Black could also have played 59 at A, building more power in the upper centre.

White now embarks on a high-level strategy with 60. White knows that Black will break through the centre with 63 on, but he hopes to maintain his attack on the whole group. Presumably Kato disliked the prospect of Black C if he played 60 at B.

White 60 astonished the professionals following the game. Perhaps it astonished Kobayashi too, for he promptly played a bad move at 61. Otake commented: 'I wouldn't play here in a million years.' Black 61, of course, loses the forcing move of D.

White leaves 60 for the time being, linking up with 64 to 72. Note that Black 69 and 71 are important. Black can't switch 69 to E, as White 71 would be too big.



Dia. 8





Figure 4 (73-87)


Figure 4 (73-87). Kato goes down a side path.

Black 73 is too cautious: it's a little slack. Black 1 and 3 in Dia. 9 should have been possible. But isn't there some danger involved?

Black will have some worries about the eye shape of his large group, but he gets one eye with 11 and 13. If he destroys White's top area he will be ahead in territory.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

White 74. Blocking off the top like this is big: it puts Kato in the game. Reinforcing with 75 and 77 is necessary. Kato's next move has a decisive effect on the game.


White 78 is a most regrettable move considering that Black has just been kind enough to play slackly — it loses the game. White perhaps expected Black 79 at A. If White had expanded the top by cutting with 1 and 3 in Dia. 10, he would have had a promising position. He could come in at 7, and it's hardly likely his invading group would be captured whole. The game might be an even contest on the board.

If 78 is the losing move, 79 is the winning move. I think this peep is a fantastic move.

Why is it fantastic? Cutting immediately with 80 is a tesuji — if Black B, White C. That means Black has no choice but to play 81, though this entails a loss of nine points, as White can block at D in sente. Kobayashi had the courage to play 79 because he judged that he would win if he could lay waste to the top. Usually one is most reluctant to play this kind of peep — the ability to make hardheaded judgements like this is something that run-of-the-mill professionals lack.



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

White 84. Even if White tries to block Black's invasion with 5 and 7 in *Dia. 11*, he breaks through on the left side with 8 and 10. If instead White blocked off the top as in *Dia. 12*, the game would be more or less close, but *Dia. 10* is superior. Having missed his best chance, White no longer feels like trying to seal off the top, nor does he feel like saving his three stones with E after Black plays 87.

Figure 5 (88–113). *Playing with maturity*

White can't be bothered saving his three stones, but swallowing them up with 93 and 95 is undeniably big. White lays waste to a lot of territory with 88, but there are so many *dame* points around the centre stones that Black gets a considerable territory there.

Laying waste to the corner with 98 is not small either. However, the overall development in the game can clearly be termed favourable

for Black. White doesn't get a chance after this. The gap closed to 1 1/2 points only because Black lost some points in the endgame. So I don't intend to make any comments on the fine points of the endgame. Instead, I would like to refer to Otake's comments on Black 61 in Figure 3.






Figure 5 (88–113)



Dia. 13



Dia. 14

The drawback from exchanging Black 'a' for White 'b' in *Dia. 13* is, first of all, that the *kosumi* of 1 becomes small. Furthermore, Black loses the forcing sequence in *Dia. 14*. However, in this game there is only a slight possibility that Black will be able to play *Dia. 14*, so the problem is not as great as Otake maintains. The only thing is that I fully understand not wanting to play 'a' in *Dia. 13*.

It was a great pity about Kato's 78. Thinking too hard about the problem led him to stray down a side path. All he had to do was to follow *Dia. 10* without considering superfluous issues and make a territorial contest of it.

On the other hand, I think that Kobayashi

is playing well. Most impressive is his all-round strength. There are no uneven spots. However, one or two problematical moves did appear. To beat Kobayashi you have to punish such moves severely when they come up. They appear in surprisingly simple positions, so beating him may be an easier proposition than people think. Other players should have more confidence in themselves.

Black wins by 1 1/2 points.

(Kido, April 1991)




Figure 6 (114–162)




Figure 7 (163–241)

111: ko (at 93);

135: connects (at 108);

136: connects (at 95)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi

Black: Kato Masao

Played in Takarazuka City on 6, 7 February 1991.




Figure 1 (1–23)

Figure 1 (1–23). An unusual opening

The focus of this game is the bottom. It starts with a somewhat unusual fuseki. The aim of 11 is to invite White to invade at the bottom so that Black can start a fight. If he makes the joseki move of 11 at 20, handling White A will be perplexing; if he makes a wider extension, to B, then it will be hard to know how to defend the bottom when White plays C.

White 14. White plays solidly, storing up strength, because he plans to invade at the bottom. White 14 at D is also possible, but Black will then play E, making it harder for White to invade.

White 16 and 18 invite Black 19. Black knows that White will invade next, but even so 19 is essential. Black could hardly defend at 20: White C would become a superb point for expanding White's moyo and he could still aim at reducing the bottom moyo with F.

When White 22 appeared on the TV monitor, Hashimoto Shoji, the Yomiuri commentator, looked dubious. 'Isn't this heavy?' he asked. Sonoda Yuichi, the satellite TV commentator, agreed. Ishii Kunio, the referee, chimed in: 'It's the weight of 100 million yen.'

referring to Kobayashi's tournament earnings last year.





Figure 2 (24-46)



Dia. 1


Figure 2 (24-46). Aggressive play by both

The continuation to 28 certainly looks heavy, but Kobayashi has a clever *sabaki* prepared.

Black 29. If Black hanes at 1 in Dia. 1, White easily lives up to 10. This result would be unsatisfactory for Black.

White 30 is the move Kobayashi is relying on to take care of his group. It seems to have got Kato's blood boiling. If the opponent grovels for life, you can condescendingly let him have it, but when he seeks to live with maximum profit, you instinctively rebel. If Black answers docilely with 1 in Dia. 2, White lives efficiently with 2 and 4. This is a stylish result for White. Note that 4 guards against the threat of Black 'a'.

Following the old instincts of 'the killer', Kato countered aggressively with 31 and 33. The latter move occasioned the following dialogue after the game.




Dia. 2

Kobayashi: 'I expected you to play 33 at 36.'

Kato: 'I thought that 33 was fighting spirit, but maybe it was an overplay.'


Kobayashi's suggestion would lead to Dia. 3. Distaste for this is why Kato played 33. Hashimoto Shoji: 'You can say all kinds of things after seeing the result, but when you're playing, 33 is the only direction your hand would go.'




Dia. 3

White 36 is an impressive move: Kobayashi is going all-out. It's unusual for potentially decisive fighting to break out so early in a title match.

The fight continues with White 42. The players in the pressroom expected a trade as in Dia. 4, but this is probably good for Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

White 46 is an important move. If White reinforces immediately with 1 in *Dia. 5*, Black descends at 2, and White's corner group cannot live unconditionally.

Note that White 46 acts as a ladder block if Black plays A, White B, Black C.




Figure 3 (47-72)


Figure 3 (47-72). Ignoring the go proverbs

The result to 48 is clearly a gain for White compared to *Dia. 5*. Kobayashi has shown his strength here. Up to 52 Kobayashi scores points, settling his outside group and living in the corner at the same time.


Black attacks the centre group with 53 and 55. However, Black 59 is dubious, and Kato expressed regrets about it. This is a high-level point, but it involves the application of two proverbs, so we will have a look at it. One is: when aiming at the right, attack on the left (*motarete semeyo*, literally, 'lean and attack'); the other is: 'drive the opponent towards your thickness'.

The leaning attack is Black 1 in *Dia. 6*. If White answers at 2, Black 3 becomes sente, so Black then attacks with 5, driving White towards his thickness. Otake Hideo: 'Kobayashi might have thought of an alternative for 2, but I agree that this is the correct direction of play. There is no reason for Black to play on the side where he's strong with 59 and 61.'

Hashimoto Shoji suggested that White might counter with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 7*. Even so, Black gets a satisfactory result.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

After White 60 it's hard for Black to continue his attack.

White 62 takes away Black's eye shape; even while undergoing attack, White wants to create *aji* for a counterattack later.

Black 67. If omitted, White has the clever move of 1 in *Dia. 8*. If Black ignores it, White gets a ko with 3 and 5.



Dia. 8 2: tenuki

When White jumps to 68, he is clearly in the lead.

White 72 is an important move. Blocking at A secures more corner territory but gives Black the option of making a second eye with C after he plays B in sente. Keeping this black group unsettled restricts Black's freedom of action. In short, 72 places more weight on attack than on profit.




Figure 4 (73-100)

Figure 4 (73-100). Good forcing moves

White 78 sets up good forcing moves at 88 and 90 before reducing the top with 94.

Black 97. The sealed move. It helps defend the cutting point to the left of 84.




Figure 5 (101-133)


Figure 5 (101-133). Kato misses his chance to make the game close.

White 2. If White answers 1 directly, Black will be able to aim at a double attack, so White reinforces with 2. Black could also have continued his attack on the top group with 1 at A.

White 6 builds centre thickness: White is playing cautiously.

Black 7. Kato regretted not playing 7 at 8, White B, Black 7, White C. That might give Black more support in attacking the centre white group.

Black 11. Fujisawa Shuko had a perceptive comment, quoted by Otake in *Kido*. He maintained that Black should take sente with 1 in *Dia. 9*. In other words, Black finishes with the top left in one move, then switches to 3 on the right side. Black would still be behind, but not as much as in the figure, and this would put more pressure on the opponent.




Dia. 9

White 20 is big in itself and also forces Black to defend his group with 21. Together with the next move, 20 shows that Kobayashi is trying to wrap up the game as quickly as possible.


White 22 is typical of Kobayashi. Securing territory as in *Dia. 10* would be more peaceful, but letting Black force with 4 and 6 would be upsetting. That's why White tries to force first with 22.

Kato concluded he would lose if he answered 22 at D, so he countered with 23 and 25, aiming at pushing through at E. However, after the game he regretted not playing 25 at 1 in *Dia. 11*. Kobayashi responded that he would have made a hane at 2.

Dia. 11. The continuation from 3 to 18 is inevitable, after which White would switch to F in the figure. Hashimoto Shoji commented that this would make the game a half-pointer, which indicates that Kato let slip a good opportunity.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11

White 26 to 30 are concerned with defending the gap at E. Instead of connecting at 31, this is another chance for Kato to follow Dia. 11. White is a little ahead when he plays 32.

Note the value of White's forcing moves. If Black cuts with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, the marked stones set up a ladder. Black may try to fight a ko with 5 and 7, but White bypasses the ko with 8 and 10. If next Black 'a', White connects at 'b', and once again the marked stones are found to be in the right place.



Dia. 12

9: ko

Figure 6 (134-172). What makes a champion

White 40. Kobayashi plays solidly, confident he has a win.

Black 51 and 53 are an attempt to exploit White's thinness in the centre. Black is hoping for White 1 in Dia. 13. Black 4 is a sharp move; the continuation to 14 is forced and is good for Black.

Kobayashi is too canny to fall for a trick like this. He dodges the attack with 54. This is a surprisingly good move, and Kato may have overlooked it. If he had known of it, he would

have played 53 at 4 in Dia. 13 immediately. That would have given a close game.

Black takes quite a lot of profit with 57 to 61, but he is still a little behind.

Black 67 must be at 70.




Figure 6 (134-172)


Black 71 is a major hallucination: these four stones are lost after White 72 (if Black A, White B, Black C, White D).

After five minutes of expressing incredulity at his own stupidity, Kato resigned.

The highlight of this game was the fight on the bottom left. White invaded Black's sphere of influence, yet came out with the superior result. His ability to find unexpected moves like 46 in Figure 2 is one of the things that make Kobayashi a champion.

Black resigns after White 172.

(Adapted from Kido, April 1991 and the Yomiuri newspaper. Kisei report translated by John Power. Games 4 to 7 will be presented in GW65.)



Dia. 13

Nie Wins the New Physical Education Cup

This year Nie Weiping is doing well in Chinese tournaments. Below is the third game from the 12th New Physical Education Cup, in which he rebuffed the challenge of Cao Dayuan 9-dan 3-2. The final game was decided by half a point. This was Nie's third title victory this year: he had already won the Qiwang and Tianyuan titles (see GW63, page 45).

White: Cao Dayuan 9-dan

Black: Nie Weiping 9-dan

Commentary by Luo Jianwen 7-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 1. Jumping to A is the usual move for 21. White would answer at B.

Figure 2. White 58 gives Black a chance to cause trouble. Pulling back at White 59 would have been more prudent. The continuation from 59 is inevitable. Living in sente up to 92 is a success for Black.

Black 95 simplifies the game. Black is winning.

White resigns after Black 209.




Figure 3 (101-150)




Figure 4 (151-209)
90: connects (right of 86)

WOMEN IN GO

by John Fairbairn

Like most games, go has traditionally been a man's world. Nevertheless, women have made a significant contribution to go, and in my assessment have had far more impact than their counterparts in chess. Indeed, even in Japan, where conditions for professional go and shogi (Japanese chess) are roughly comparable, female pros are still doing rather poorly in shogi. They are barely above the level of the strongest amateurs, whereas in go they have reached the high-dan levels and seem to be moving ever forward.

Fascinating though it would be to expound on the whys and wherefores, I shall have to leave that to better qualified people. But by way of introduction to the subject, I propose to pluck out of the records those go episodes and biographies that I believe make up the history of women in the game prior to the most modern times. Their recent achievements have of course been well chronicled in the pages of *Go World*.

China

The earliest references to women playing go are in the *Xijing Zaji* (Jottings from the Western Capital, i.e. Chang'an), attributed to Ge Hong of the Jin period (265–420). This is a collection of anecdotes of the preceding Han period. One grim story is that 'the ladies of the court went out on the 4th day of the 8th month by the northern door of the Palace of Carvings and played go beneath the bamboos. The winners had good luck all year round; the losers had sickness and disease all year.'

Despite the apparent hazard of playing go, it became enormously popular from the Jin era onwards, and seems to have been enjoyed by many women in the households of scholar-officials, although it initially had a somewhat equivocal status, in that strict Confucian moralists generally disapproved of it. It was not until Tang times (618–907) that the game was firmly established as one of the 'four accomplishments': lute, go, calligraphy, and painting.

There are several go stories from the Tang period, and women feature in a few. In the earliest, the game still has ominous portents. The Empress Wu (625–705), who be it noted (since we are discussing women's achievements) had the unique position of being China's only female Emperor, held on to power by usurping the rights of her sons to succeed her dead husband. One night she had a dream that she was playing go and lost repeatedly. She later asked her minister Di Renjie for an interpretation of this dream. He bravely replied that to lose at go was a symbol of the loss of her sons, and the dream was a warning from Heaven not to flout the rights of her own children. Di was cleverly exploiting the fact that the Chinese word for 'son' and 'go piece' is the same (zi). Wu Zhao ignored him but at least let him keep his head on his shoulders.

The next story is just an incidental reference, and has already been mentioned in *Go World* 47, page 7. In this, the Emperor Xuan Zong (r. 712–756) was playing go but losing. Seeing his perturbed face, his beloved concubine Yang Guifei released a pet Samarkand lapdog (not a monkey as Pinckard suggests) she was holding. It scrambled over the board, disarranging the pieces, and the Emperor was greatly pleased. This story appears in Zhang Ying's anthology, *Yuan Jian Lei Han*.

Another story refers to Wang Jixin, the Meijin of Xuan Zong's time. Wang was an Expectant Official (dai zhao) of the Hanlin Academy, which was the rank given to all court go professionals in Imperial China. 'Expectant' referred to the fact that they had not yet received (and never would receive!) the Imperial summons to serve as full-time officials, but of course they did play with and before the Emperor.

This story about Wang appears in several books, but the most detailed version is the *Ji Yi Ji* (Records of Collected Curiosities) by Xue Yongruo in the mid-9th century.

It was 755, the time of the famous An Lushan rebellion. An's 'barbarian army' was

converging on Xuan Zong's capital, and so the Emperor led his court, including Wang, to Chengdu in Shu (Szechwan). As Xue tells it:

Emperor Xuan Zong set off southwards and all his officials quickly repaired to his temporary headquarters. Wang Jixin, who was the best go player in the Hanlin Academy, accompanied them. The road to Shu was steep and narrow and when they stopped to rest at a post station on the way, most of the people's homes were occupied by eminent officials and those with influence, so that Wang had nowhere to stay there.

He therefore had to go far upstream to stay at a widow's cottage in the mountains. There was only the old woman and her daughter-in-law and they could supply him with just water and a fire. As soon as it became dark, the two women locked up and went to bed, while Wang retired under the eaves. Though it was late in the night he could not sleep. Suddenly he heard the old woman inside calling to the young one: 'It is a nice evening, but there is nothing to do. Shall I play a game of go with you?' The daughter-in-law said, 'Fine.' Wang thought to himself that this was odd, the more so that there was no light inside the house and the two women were in rooms on opposite sides of the house. He therefore pressed his ear to the shutters.

After a while he heard the young woman say: 'To begin I will play East 5, South 9.' The old woman replied: 'I play East 5, South 12.' The young woman continued: 'I will play West 8, South 10.' The old woman replied: 'I play West 9, South 10.' Every time they played a move, both women thought long and hard. The night had already passed into the fourth watch, but Wang was carefully remembering the moves one by one. Only 36 moves had been played when suddenly he heard the old woman say: 'You have already lost. I win by quite a few points.' The young woman acknowledged this.

When dawn came, Wang straightened his clothes and cap and went to ask for instruction. The widow said: 'All right. Set up a board and place the pieces on it as you see fit.' Wang immediately took a paper board from his bag and played out a secret opening that he had spent his whole life perfecting. Before barely a

dozen moves had been played, the old woman turned to her daughter-in-law and said: 'Child, you may teach him our ordinary openings.'

The young woman thereupon showed him how to attack and defend, how to kill and capture, how to save stones and give way, how to protect and build thickness — but only in brief detail. Wang therefore asked for more explanation. The old woman smiled and said: 'With just this you will be without equal among men!' So Wang thanked her wholeheartedly and took his leave. He had gone just a short way and then turned back, only to find the house he was looking for had already disappeared. But from then on Wang Xijin's skill was completely unsurpassed. He played over the position from the game between the two women that he had remembered, and racked his brains over it. He tried to see how it was such a clear win but could not. He therefore named the position 'Deng Ai [a famous general] sets out for Shu'. Even today we have a record of this game, but no one has been able to solve it.

Fairy stories like this were very popular in Tang times, but some believe Wang invented this one himself to pretend his skill had a mystical source. (The position referred to is no longer extant, and we have just one other position attributable to Wang.)

Japan

There are similar passing references in early Japanese literature, too — notably in *The Pillow Book of Sei Shonagon* and *The Tale of Genji*, both by women writers. But for the first substantive reference to female go we have to wait until the late 18th century, when we have the first record of a game by a woman, Yokozeki Iho.

Three of her games remain. The earliest is taking two stones against Yasuoka Shuhei in 1775. The other two are in 1778, when she was supposed to be 17 (by the Oriental count — 16 or 15 by ours). One was against the famous monk Komatsu Kaizen, whose 'Great Masterpiece' is in G34, page 54. He was about 5-dan. Only 81 moves are recorded, however. The other, given here (Box 1), was against Nakao Kunitsugu, of whom little is known but who was believed to be 1-dan.

Game One

White: Nakao Kunitsugu

Black: Yokozeki Iho

This is the second earliest game record involving a woman and was played on 22 February 1778. Only 171 moves are known. Black won by 6 points.

The game appears in both *Toryu Gokyo Ruishu* and *Rankado Kiwa* but with some differences. This record follows the latter except for transposition of White 40 and 42 (as in the former), a change recommended by Sugiuchi Kazuko.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50)

Black 27. Black's play may seem rather slack, but it is cool and steady.

Black 31 is good.

Black 35. A severe combination, but also makes things onerous for herself.

White 36. This cut turns out to be unreasonable.

Figure 2 (51-100)

Black 51. Excellent shape-making.

Black 55. Iho has victory in her grasp.

Black 67. Iho's last few moves have been very solid and show her confidence in securing life for her centre group. Defending at 'a' with 93 is better for Black. Probably she didn't see that White can connect along the edge.




Figure 2 (51-100)

91: connects (right of 67)

Figure 3 (101-171)

Black 1 does not work because of the defect at 'a'.

Black 11. Defending at 33 is the steady option, but she judges that White 'b' makes the game too close for comfort.

White 18. Black seems to have imperilled herself by letting White play these moves, but she has a fine squeeze sequence in the corner in reserve.

Black 53. This hane connection eliminates the aji at 'c' and settles the game for Black. She is about 10 points ahead.




Figure 3 (101-171)

According to Mrs. Sugiuchi Kazuko 8-dan (on whose full-length commentaries I have based some of the game notes given here), Yokozeki in this game showed the strength of a modern 1-dan professional. Nothing is known of what became of her.

The Nineteenth Century

In general, references to women go players before the Meiji Restoration (1868) are extremely sparse. For example, one of the more detailed records is of a Yasui (later Miyai) Ryu, elder sister of the 9th head of the Yasui school, Sanchi, and daughter of the 8th Yasui, Senchi. A party to celebrate her promotion to 1-dan was held in 1824 and she later advanced to 2-dan before marrying a retainer of the Tosa clan.

One of the things I find most remarkable about both go and shogi, incidentally, is the way ability seems to run in families. The most astounding example was shogi's Ito family, where Ito Soin I (1667–1723), himself a Meijin, had five sons (none adopted) who respectively became Meijin, posthumous Meijin, 8-dan, 7-dan and genius-cut-down-in-the-bloom-of-youth (the great Intatsu). The surviving sons in turn produced other high-dan players. In both games it is very common to have two or more professionals from within the same family. In contrast, ability in western chess (as with go in China) has generally been an individual thing. The Polgar sisters have shown that it does not have to be.

I wonder whether we in the West have mistakenly treated ability in chess as a talent, stressing creativity, rather than a craft. If so, this has perhaps stemmed from our approach to thinking, which in turn derives from our languages, categorised by linguists as analytical. This means, in part, that we stress the search for new elements. Japanese, however, is a synthetic language and so their thought processes reflect that. Is not craftsmanship synthesising known elements?. Chinese is an analytical language too, by the way. This might make an interesting Ph.D. thesis for a go-playing student.

Returning to the pre-Meiji era, we know of one Suzuki Tsuya because she was the wife of

Suzuki Chisei, a 6-dan who died in 1835. She and Noguchi Matsu reached 2-dan with the Honinbo school. The strongest female player of these times, however, appears to have been Toyota Gen, a 3-dan also associated with the Honinbos. There is a handful of other known names, most of them 1-dan, but only meagre details (and none of their games) remain.

The first female player of real note was Hayashi Sano (1825–1901). She was also the only one to bridge the Edo and Meiji periods as an active player. Born in Edo to a family called Mikawa, she excelled at go as a child and was adopted by the famous Hayashi family — along with the Honinbo, Yasui and Inoue families this was one of the four patronised by the Shogunate. Her adoptive father was Hayashi Fujisaburo, head of a collateral branch of the main family. She reached 1-dan in 1840 and 2-dan in 1845. Soon afterwards she reached 3-dan, but this was a troubled time — the death throes of the Edo Shogunate — and promotions were hard to come by. She therefore stayed 3-dan until some time soon after helping to found Hoensha in 1879, when she was 54.

Hoensha was an umbrella organisation of professionals left high and dry by the end of the Shogunate and can be regarded as a direct precursor of the Nihon Ki-in. Hayashi Sano played 72 games there, scoring 16 wins, 47 losses and 4 draws with 5 unfinished (see Box 2). She withdrew from active play in 1890 and died in 1901. But her influence is still felt because her adopted pupils were the female players Hayashi Kiku 1-dan and Kita Fumi, and the famous male player Nakagawa Senji, one of the founders of the Nihon Ki-in.

She was a very independent lady. Although married to a painting teacher called Yoneyama, she refused to take his name, and she was as fond of sake-bibbing as male professionals. She once had a drinking match with some male colleagues which she won hands down. But on the way home through the snow, she was so drunk she fell and knocked out six front teeth.

Among Hayashi's less eminent female peers there are a couple worth mentioning. One is Ito Shige (1837–1915). She was the only woman along with Hayashi who could be said to be earning a living from go in the Meiji period.

Game Two

White: Nakagawa Kamesaburo 7-dan

Black: Hayashi Sano 3-dan (2 stones)

Played on 17 July 1881 at Hoensha. 154 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1-100)

Figure 1 (1-100)

White 63. Nakagawa has done well to live here, despite some overplays, but even now he seems to be striving to extract too much out of the situation. He would have done better to play 71 at once.

Black 64. The fight Sano is now starting with 58 and 64 is the kind of game she relished. It was she who was probably responsible for the common exaggeration that women's games are all mad fighting games. Logically 64 is in the wrong direction, since Black should not be inviting White's next two moves. However, this kind of off-centre attack is typical of very many of Sano's games, so she obviously knew what she was doing.

Black 70. Again unnaturally pursuing the attack. The simpler 77 was big and safe.

White 71. A good point.

Black 74. Painful, but the alternative is

bad shape.

Black 78. She is constrained on what she can do on this move by the need to think about the ladder stone 51. Black is still ahead, however. Her overzealous attacks have been cancelled out by White's overplays.

Black 80. More attack. Again, it was a feature of Sano's style that she always favoured direct means of attack. The best move was at 106.




Figure 2 (101-154)

45, 48: take ko; 52: fills ko

Figure 2 (101-154)

Black 6. The good point at last. This confirms Black's lead.

Black 16. Over-elaborate. 28 was correct.

White 31. The left side was bigger. White must play there to compensate for Black's centre.

White 33. White is aiming one point below 32. This is big as an endgame play but not big enough for this stage of the game.

White 37. Risks another overplay, although simply connecting at 44 leaves the game close enough to count. Sano accepts the challenge with 38, because connecting at 51 gives White a free forcing move.

White 45. As Black has calculated, this is a ko White cannot fight.

She was a pupil of the famous Ito Showa when she was 10, but was later taught by Nakagawa Kamesaburo. For a time she had progressed in step with her fellow pupil and friend Iwasaki Kenzo (1842–1912), who eventually became one of the supreme players of the time. (I have told his story in *Go World* 32, pages 60–64).

Ito married at 19 to a garden designer and had one son and four daughters, the last, Kinoko, making up yet another family go pairing but, I believe, the only ever mother-daughter one. Ito was awarded a 2-dan diploma by Honinbo Shuwa, but she was a devoted teacher rather than a player — what the Japanese now call a 'lesson pro'. When her husband died, she opened a go school which included among its pupils Hirose Heijiro, future president of Hoensha. (See Box 3)

We may mention too Kokubu Kuni. Born in 1849 in Osaka, she learnt go at 7 and was 1-dan at 16. Eventually she got to 3-dan but died young at 31 in 1879 of tuberculosis. Possibly she was weakened when young by having to run her family's fish shop (hence her nickname 'Sakanaya Okuni' — Kuni the fishwife) and look after both parents. She was noted too for her heavy workload in teaching go. But she had spirit.

One anecdote about her (it is told in a slightly different version in GW32) is that when she came to Tokyo and joined a club in Kanda, a man who appeared rather rustic played her first. When Kokubu presumptuously took White, the old man placed nine stones and played like a beginner, except that he never missed the most urgent points. This infuriated Kokubu. She lost self control and, of course, all her stones. The old man was in fact Iwasaki Kenzo.

For those who, like me, sense the possibilities of a soap opera about go, there is further rich material in the two Yoshidas. One was Taeko, a 1-dan who died in 1940. Her claim to fame is merely her notorious infatuation with Honinbo Shuho. Rather more interesting was Yoshida Etsu. She moved from Owari to Tokyo with her sister to be a pupil of Honinbos Shuwa then Shuho. She was married for a while to Uchigaki Suekichi 5-dan, through the intervention of Shuho, but they soon separated. She then opened a training

school (she was 3-dan) in Ueno which attracted one of go's most famous patrons, Okubo Koto, and they became lovers. After Okubo's death, Yoshida shaved her head and retired to a Kamakura nunnery.

Even better perhaps would be the rivalries between some of the players of late Edo times. Among the women there was one between Nakano Gen of the Honinbo school and her fellow pupil Katagiri Masa. Katagiri lost repeatedly to Nakano and took this so much to heart that, one day, she disguised herself and waylaid Nakano as she was cleaning the house prior to practice. But even then she lost — Nakano was the daughter of a samurai and very handy with a brush. Perhaps it wasn't Katagiri, but Nakano claimed afterwards it was, so she won at every possible stage: opening, middle game and endgame.

In contrast, there were two ladies serving in the Shogun's court (this story comes from Hayashi Sano, who taught them go), Mihono and Sakae, who had an intense rivalry. Mihono was much stronger at go, but Sakae had the better of her in halberd practice. One day the Shogun decided to ask for a demonstration of his ladies' martial skills and Sakae took the opportunity to give Mihono an extra special drubbing. This was talked about so much afterwards that Mihono in mortification cropped her hair and became a nun.

The Twentieth Century

The dominant female figure this century has undoubtedly been Kita Fumi (or Fumiko — omitting the -ko was the old style). Apart from her considerable go skill, she is regarded as one of the great benefactors of the game.

She was born in 1875, the second daughter of Shiba Mitsuyuki, a physician, but at the age of five was adopted by Hayashi Sano. However, it seems she did not learn go until she was 11. By 18 (all ages here are the Oriental count) she was 1-dan and at 21 (in 1895) was 3-dan. In this year she married Roppeita, a No play master of the Kita school, and for a few years devoted herself to raising a family.

Her first claim to fame was defeating five male players in a row in a series sponsored by the newspaper Kokumin Shinbun, but after her absence she remarkably repeated the feat

Game Three

White: Ito Shigeko 2-dan

Black: Takahashi Yukiko 2-dan

Date and venue unknown. First published in Igo Shinpo #322, 1906.

188 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50)

Black 17. An unorthodox strategy.

White 28. Questionable, because it allows Black's strong next move. 63 is better.

White 32. Yet another bad move. It helps Black reinforce her corner and so is *aji-keshi* (prematurely erasing potential). If White has to play in this corner, the correct move is at 34. Because of this bad move White gets embroiled in a painful fight.

White 50. Sugiuchi believes the game record is faulty. To make sense of the play in the upper left corner, Black must have played the 'a'–'b' exchange at some point. Game records were often compiled from memory.

Figure 2 (51–100)

Black 55. Proof that White is suffering.

Black 61. Again the game record is suspect. It makes more sense to assume Black's last two moves were transposed.

Black 63. A little too easy-going. 67 is better.

White 68. Finding this move and the follow-up connection sequence shows considerable strength.

White 78. Despite this big move, Black is still ahead.

Black 83. A terrible move — enough to lose the game. It throws away the centre for the sake of a few points on the side. The correct move was 89.

White 96. Now White's victory is assured.

Black 99. A desperate attempt at *sabaki*, but White is going to get territory on one side or the other. For the rest of the game Black is really just looking for an excuse to resign.




Figure 2 (51–100)




Figure 3 (101–188)

10: connects (below 6); 67: takes ko (at 57)

Figure 3 (101–188). Black 65. The original record in Igo Shinpo puts this move to the right of 65, but that is a patent error.

twice under more difficult conditions: in a Yoro-choh-sponsored match in 1911 between the Honinbos and Hoensha she won five games (with the normal handicaps) against Honinbo Shusai (then 8-dan), Inoue Inseki 5-dan, Nozawa Chikucho 4-dan, Tsuchiya (= Honinbo) Shugen 4-dan, and Inoue Kohei 3-dan. In the same year, the famous publisher Fukuzawa Yukichi had his paper *Jiji Shinpo* organise a tournament in which she again won five in a row. 1911 was truly her annus mirabilis for she also received a 4-dan diploma from Hoensha, and her fame was then such that her promotion party was a gala event at which she was presented with silver sake cups by Prince Fushimi of the Imperial blood. 4-dan, the same rank as Hayashi Sano, was still the highest rank ever achieved by a woman. It took her just 10 years to surpass this, making 5-dan in 1921. (Box 4)

Despite these trail-blazing achievements, however, she is best remembered as a peacemaker among the rival go groups of the time. When Nozawa Chikucho was ostracised by the Honinbo House for criticising Shusai (he wrote scathing newspaper articles on Shusai's commentaries under the heading 'Commentaries on the Commentaries'), she exerted every effort and succeeded in influencing the statesman Furushima Kazuo to persuade the two players to come to terms. She also tried, though without much success, to reconcile the Honinbos and Hoensha. Eventually she parted with Hoensha herself in 1922 and turned her attentions to founding the Chuo Ki-in with Onoda Chiyotaro 5-dan and others. This turned out to be a brief step on the way to the Nihon Ki-in.

Kita was active too as a teacher, taking under her wing female players such as Ito Tomoe 5-dan, Oyama Toshiko 3-dan and Suzuki Tsunako 3-dan. In 1938 she reached 6-dan, but after the war her health declined and she died, aged 76, in 1950. The Nihon Ki-in promoted her at once to 7-dan in recognition of her great contribution.

Though eclipsed by Kita, another notable female player of this era was Tsuzuki Yoneko (1872–1937). Her original name was Murata, but she was adopted at the age of 6 by a pro called Tsuzuki Senshi. He was ranked only equivalent to an amateur 5-dan and, as he had

retired anyway, she did not learn much from him. In 1887 she had a 7-stone game with Honinbo Shuei as a result of which she became his pupil. She was also taught by the Yasui disciple Umezu Nagae. She reached 1-dan in 1890, joined Hoensha around the turn of the century, and progressed to 2-dan in 1901 and 3-dan in 1906. Her results in Hoensha were 21–23, but her greatest achievement came in 1907 when she won the famous ladies' tournament that will be described below. (Box 5)

In 1909, with Kita Fumiko, Tsuzuki was invited to join the new organisation Igo Doshikai which was formed by Nakagawa Senji (formerly Ishii Senji) and a group of 'new stars'. It was dissolved in 1912 when Nakagawa became president of Hoensha, but in its short life offered a platform for young talent since it had its own journal, *Igo Sekai*. She continued to improve and reached 4-dan in 1922, her peak apart from an honorary 5-dan on her death. She effectively retired soon after 1924 despite joining the newly formed Nihon Ki-in and registering to play in its grading tournament, the Oteai. Noted as a generous person, she spent her last years teaching amateurs. She remained a spinster all her life, and lived alone, having just one pupil, Yoshida Shizu 2-dan.

I have already mentioned Ito Shige. Her daughter Kinoko (1875–1956) was also prominent at the same time as Kita and Tsuzuki. From 1-dan at 19 she advanced to 2-dan in 1906 and 3-dan in 1915, playing mostly in Hoensha, with good results. She was one of the many players who emigrated to China in 1928 where (accompanied briefly by Tsuzuki) she formed the Tsingtao Ki-in, returning to Japan after the war. There she continued her mother's school when she died. She is one of the better known female players largely because so many of her games remain. This is because a long series was published in the newspaper *Yamato Shinbun*.

There was yet another Yoshida in this period, Misako — originally Inoue Misako. She was born in 1881 in Kyoto and was taught go at home by both parents. At the age of 16 she received the support of some merchants in Osaka and was able to devote herself fully to the game. At that time the principal pros in Osaka included Inoue Inseki, Izumi Shutetsu

Game Four

White: Segoe Kensaku 3-dan

Black: Kita Fumiko 3-dan (sen)

Played at Hoensha; published in Jiji Shinpo in March 1911. 249 moves. White resigns.




Figure 1 (1-100)

Figure 1 (1-100)

Black 27. Thick, and typical of Kita's style — storing up power to unleash a violent attack later on.

Black 43. Iwasaki Kenzo faulted this move, since it prompts the good move of 44 by White. He suggested 45.

Black 51. But this was the point of Kita's play. She preferred to get in these forcing moves, overconcentrating White, to inhibit White's invasion somewhere above 9.

Black 53. The centre is more important — should be at 90.

White 54. Natural — the only target left for White now that Black has settled her group with 53. Though White's options have been thus limited, it is a very tough move for Black to deal with.

Black 55. The obvious cap at 84 does not work.

White 56 is good, but 58 is terrible — probably the losing move, said Iwasaki. Should be at 64 (Sugiuchi) or 'a' (Iwasaki).

White 68. White has played too many moves in this corner, but having played 58

he seems obliged to make sense of it by capturing two stones. The real problem lies in letting Black strengthen her centre with 61 and 63.




Figure 2 (101-150)

Figure 2 (101-150)

Black 1. The game is close, but Black's positions are thicker, so she has the advantage. But with 2 White begins a desperate endgame race.

White 44. Very skilful endgame play. Worth three points more than White 48—Black 49.

Black 47. If Black resists at 49, White gets big endgame plays in the region of 54.




Figure 3 (151-200)

89: ko (at 71)

and Abe Kamesaburo, and she played with them, but she was fond of the notably affable Takazaki Taisaku 6-dan and studied most often with him.

When Kokubu Kuni died in 1879, Yoshida




Figure 4 (201-249)

14, 17, 20: ko; 26: right of 23;
37: ko (at 11); 40, 43, 46, 49: ko

Figure 3 (151-200)

White 62. Segoe has conducted a splendid endgame and has pulled Black right back. But now Black has sente and the chance to display her own endgame skill.

Black 69. The game now hinges on the endgame skirmish in this corner.

Black 71. Two or three points better than the simple hane at 74.

Black 91. Kita has shown superb skill in this fight, especially in the order of moves — enough to cancel out White's earlier endgame successes.

Figure 4 (201-249)

White 6. The final mistake. Playing at 23 would keep the game close, and probably in White's favour.

White 18. A mistake. 23 would leave the game open to within one point, because it provides extra ko threats.

White resigns precisely for lack of ko threats.

was hailed as the new female hope of the Kansai (west Japan around Osaka as opposed to Kanto, east Japan around Tokyo), and so went to Tokyo to try her strength in teaching games with Honinbos Shuei and Shusai. In 1899 she was given 1-dan by Hoensha and 2-dan from both Hoensha and the Honinbos in 1906. She then married a lawyer and travelled abroad with him, but was still able to progress to 3-dan by 1915, with diplomas from Hoensha and the Inoue family. It was about then that she settled in Kyoto as a part-timer yet still managed to get a 4-dan diploma in 1922 from all three schools: Hoensha, Honinbo and Inoue. She obviously knew how to influence people, and was the moving force behind the erection of a monument to Honinbo Sansa in the Jakko Temple in 1927.

Her own school in Kyoto included Fujita Goro 6-dan (Rin Kaiho's first teacher in Japan) and Shiomi Suzuko, the future wife of Hashimoto Utaro. In 1938 she reached 5-dan and was awarded an honorary 6-dan in 1944 just before her death from cancer. This was followed by a posthumous 7-dan.

Takeda Itsuko (1875-1935) was an interesting player. Her father was a Hashimoto vassal who had taken part in the Meiji Restoration wars. She learnt go early and in 1887 enrolled in the women's section of Hoensha. Her name was then Takahashi Kanko. It was not clear why she changed it and she rarely talked about her past. It is also unclear when she reached 1-dan, but by 1907 she was playing as 2-dan. In 1915 she advanced to 3-dan yet her name rarely appeared in newspapers or magazines and few of her games remain. Her main go activity seems to have been as a lesson pro, very popular with amateurs, and her pro pupils included Hoshino Toshi 9-dan and many others.

She was a spinster but well capable of looking after herself, as befitted the daughter of a samurai. She was famous for splitting coal with her bare hands to heat the bath, and excelled in karate, kendo, judo, the lute, calligraphy and the tea ceremony. She was also the women's number one in Japan with the halberd. She was strict, very strong and disliked flowery things. Indeed, in photographs she looks ill suited to her kimono.

For completeness of the event described in

Game Five

White: Tsuzuki Yoneko 3-dan

Black: Takeda Itsuko 2-dan (*sen'aisen*)

Onna Kikaku Oteai Final, 5 June 1907.

188 moves. Black resigns.




Figure 1 (1-100)

71: takes ko (at 61)

Figure 1 (1-100)

Black 15, 17 and 19 are all slack moves, and for Black 25 it is better aji to play at 55.

White 26. Too early, thus giving Black a chance to recover — which she takes. White should have played at A.

Black 35. Strong, but missing the strongest move at 37.

White 36. Either way, because of White's overplay at 26, Black now has an easy game.

Black 47. Brings the play in this area to a close — or so she thought!

White 48. Once again White overplays. The correct move was to take a big point somewhere around A and aim at attaching at B later.

Black 55. Apart from losing the potential of the attachment at B, White has also lost the peep at C.

Black 81. Iwasaki thought this was bad since it strengthens White — he recommended 84 — but Sugiuchi demurred somewhat. Black was playing the move for the wrong reasons, as her next move showed.

Black 83. Very bad and strongly condemned by Sugiuchi. The only move was 87.

Black 95. A losing move: D would keep Black in the lead.




Figure 2 (101-188)

60: takes at left of 57; 62: connects

at 53; 63: two points left of 57;

64: connects at 57

Figure 2 (101-188)

White 8. A terrible result for Black. But there is still a fight in the centre to think about, and an opportunity for White to overplay again... which she takes with 12.

White 30. This exchange is a loss for Black, but it does defend in sente against White 47.

White 36. Sets off on what is obviously a misreading. This move should be at 39.

White 44. A horrible result for White. Capturing five stones with 48, however, keeps White in the lead.

White 50. Another misreading. The right move in this life-and-death position is 51.

White 54. White only gets a ko instead.

Black 57. White 58 would be ko too.

Black 59. Black A would be a ko, but Black declines to fight it. The original commentary in Mainichi Denpo suggests she mistakenly thought White was dead.

Black 65. Black therefore looks for consolation elsewhere but chooses the wrong move in the right area. Extending to 70 would make the game close.

White 66. This seals Black's fate.

White 86 enables White to win the race by one move.

the next paragraph, I will just mention briefly here a few more players: yet another Yoshida, a 1-dan called Kiku who was a famous authoress of several go books in the early Taisho period; Hirose Nakako 1-dan, wife of Hirose Heijiro 8-dan; and a reprise mention of Hayashi Sano's pupil, Kikuko 1-dan.

All the players just described featured in one of the most important events in women's go history. This was the Onna Kikaku Oteai or Women's Go Tournament — the first ever — which was held over three days in June 1907 in Ueno, Tokyo. It was sponsored by the newspaper Mainichi Denpo and was for pros living in Tokyo only. Newspaper coverage was immense and numerous celebrities from other fields attended as spectators.

It was a knockout tournament with handicaps, incorporating the unusual komi of 3 points. The prizes were: for the winner a gold watch; for the runner-up and semi-finalists gold rings; and for the quarter-finalists silver rings. The rest received ordinary clocks.

The results were:

Hayashi Kikuko 1d	Yoshida	Takeda	Tsuzuki
Yoshida Kiku 1d			
Hirose Nakako 1d	Takeda		
Takeda Itsuko 2d			
Ito Kinoko 2d	Tsuzuki		
Tsuzuki Yoneko 3d			
Inoue Misako 2d	Tsuzuki		
Kita Fumiko 3d			

Kita was obviously the firm favourite, but she had only just returned to go after a 10-year layoff. Perhaps the players did not take it too seriously anyway, seeing it rather as a publicity event. Certainly, on day 2, when Yoshida Kiku was playing Takeda, she suddenly recalled something from a different occasion that made her smile. Inoue (later Yoshida) Misako was sitting watching beside her and caught the mood. Soon the pair of them were engulfed in a fit of giggles. Takeda of course had the last laugh.

Modern Times

Turning now, just briefly, to modern times,

we must mention first Suzuki Hideko (1900–49). Originally called Taoka Suzuko, she was taught by Kita Fumiko, having learnt go at 10 when she went to Korea with her father. She joined Kita at 11 when they returned to Tokyo the following year. At that rate of progress great things were obviously expected of her, and she was regarded as the female equivalent of Honinbo Shusai's star pupil Kogishi Soji (1898–1924), who died tragically young of typhoid fever, already 5-dan after some phenomenal results. (He averaged 90% — but it is comforting to us that he ended a record 32-game winning streak by misreading a ladder.)

Suzuki only reached 4-dan, however, in 1932, having married Suzuki Tamejiro 6-dan (he of the *Great Joseki Dictionary*) in 1923. This was the first marriage between modern professional players, although it did not last. According to her pupil, the endgame specialist Kano Yoshinori 9-dan, in her later years, with financial problems and separated from her husband, she suffered badly from nerves. This probably contributed to her death when she was knocked over by a tram. (Box 6)

The brightest star in Japanese go, as far as grades are concerned, has been Sugiuchi Kazuko, wife of Masao 9-dan. Born in 1927, she also was taught by Kita Fumiko and made 1-dan in 1942, progressing steadily to 7-dan in 1973, and then finally to 8-dan in 1983, the highest grade ever achieved by a Japanese woman. She is from another one of those remarkable go families. One younger sister is Honda Sachiko (born 1930) and another is Kusunoki Teruko (born 1939), two of the most successful female pros today. The former is 6-dan and the latter 7-dan.

Sugiuchi's feat has since been matched by Kong Xiangming (1955–) from Chengdu in China who reached 8-dan in 1985. She is the wife of Nie Weiping 9-dan. They have all been overtaken, however, by the Chinese star Rui Naiwei from Shanghai. Rui was born right at the end of 1963, and entered the lists as 4-dan in 1982, moving up to 5-dan the same year.

Then inexorably followed 6-dan in 1984, 7-dan in 1985 (the year she turned professional)

Continued on page 51

Game Six

White: Yoshida Misako 4-dan

Black: Suzuki Hideko 3-dan (*sen'aisen*)

East-West Japan Women's Match.

Published in Jiji Shinpo, January 25 to February 9, 1931.

16 hours each. 302 moves. Black wins by 2 points.




Figure 1 (1-50)




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 1 (1-50)

White 30. An overplay. Should be 35.

White 38. Correct. White 39 would be bad here.

Black 45. White has a difficult game on her hands because of her overplay, but this game is being played at a high level. The fuseki has a very modern feel. There is

fighting spirit, the shapes are good, and the play is imaginative.

Black 47. This kind of solid move is all right in no-komi games such as this one, but Black could have challenged at 49.

Figure 2 (51-100)

White 82. It can never be bad for Black to make White grovel for life like this, but White is actually putting up a spirited fight.

Black 87 is too ambitious. Simply playing 'a' is best.

White 100. Lives in gote. Had she had the foresight to play the White 'b'-Black 'c' exchange earlier, she could have lived in sente with 'd'. (But note she would have to omit the move 98.)




Figure 2 (101-200)




Figure 4 (151-200)

82: ko

Figure 3 (101–150)

White 10. Giving White this move makes the game close. Black should have played in this area on move 5 or 9.

White 20. White could have made waves with 39.

Time taken: White 3 hours 26 minutes, Black 5 hours 46 minutes.




Figure 3 (201–302)

10: takes (left of 9); 15: connects (above 3);
44: takes ko (above 41);
47, 50, 53, 56, 59, 62: take ko
63: two points left of 9; 64: connects (at 9)
65, 68, 71, 74, 77, 80, 83, 86, 89, 92: take ko
94: fills ko (at 41). Each fills half-point kos.

Game Seven

White: Rui Naiwei

Black: Hua Xueming

Chinese Women's Championship, Fuzhou, 15 September 1989.

Komi: 2.75 points (Chinese rules). 218 moves, Black resigns.

The Chinese women's championship is an 11-round all-play-all event. Rui, from Shanghai, won all 11 games. This was the critical one, in Round 4, because it was against the eventual runner-up, when both had scored 4–0. Hua, representing the People's Liberation Army, eventually finished with 9–2.

Comments are based on those by Rui in *Wei Qi*.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50)

White 36. This cut sets the beacon-fires burning. The sequence to 49 is now forced.

White 50. White very much wanted to play 'a' but rated it as too risky.




Figure 2 (51–100)

Figure 2 (51–100)

Black 53. A good move — keeps the pressure on White.

White 54. Again White wanted to play at 'a', but the cutting point at 'b', the waist of the knight's move, is too much to leave behind.

The exchange 66–67 is bad for White but her long straggling group needs support.

Black 89. Very big. But White's capture of the three stones at the top is much bigger than it looks, because it stabilises White's groups. The point of that will be seen in White's next move.




Figure 3 (101-150)

Figure 3 (101-150)

Black 11. Bad. Should simply be at 45.

White 20. Vulgar but forced. White 22 does not work without this.

Black 27. Probably an oversight. Black 25 gives respite to the large centre group, but White 26 makes it impossible for Black to save anything on the right side. Black 27 indicates she thought she perhaps could.

White 38. Cautious, while at the same time threatening Black's big centre group.

Figure 4 (151-218)

Black 53. Black seems to have lost the flow of the game here. There are more pressing matters on the left and in the centre.

White 56. The correct move is at 58.

White 64. Since this is now the best White can do, 50 turns out to have been almost a wasted move. Black's left-side group is not yet safe, but there are weaknesses in the surrounding white groups, so she can wait a while yet.

Black 99. Secures life at last.

Black 101. The losing move. It should be at 111, in which case Black can still make a game of it.

White 116 kills Black's centre group.




Figure 4 (151-218)

109: connects

and 8-dan in 1986. Finally, the ultimate accolade of 9-dan was bestowed in 1988. (Box 7)

Reports that she has since left go to find a husband indicate that however far women have come in go over the two millennia briefly surveyed here, they still have to play the game of life giving rather a large komi.

Continued from Page 7


Miharu was born on 16 March 1910 as the eldest daughter of the proprietor of a ryokan in the hot spring resort of Jigokudani in Nagano (Jigokudani translates as 'hell valley'); it was where Kitani and Go Seigen worked out the New Fuseki in the summer of 1933. In 1931 she married Kitani Minoru, then 5-dan, and very soon after setting up their first household in Tokyo the two started taking in live-in disciples, whom Kitani 'collected' on his numerous trips around Japan, to share bed and board with the eight children of their own they eventually had. Disciples were treated just like their own children; surprisingly, only one of their children, Reiko, now 6-dan and the wife of Kobayashi Koichi, became a professional.

When you look at how Kitani disciples have dominated the titles in recent decades, the size of the debt the go world owes Kitani Miharu is apparent.

Conventional Wisdom: Right or Wrong?

In the following discussion from a past issue of *Kido*, Murakami Akira, a go writer, asks two of the recognized intellectuals in the go world, Ishida Yoshio 9-dan and Kudo Norio 9-dan, to comment on some of the conventional wisdom about the game that passes as gospel with most players.

Topic 1: Attaching to the stronger stone.




Which attachment: 'a' or 'b'?

Murakami: Attaching against the stronger white stone at 'a' is conventional wisdom; it's a sort of joseki.


Kudo: Do you want us to say that Black 'b' is just as good?

Murakami: Not unless it's the truth.

Ishida: Basically, if Black attaches 1 to the stronger white stone in *Dia. 1* and continues through 5, he's attacking the marked white stone, which makes the black pincer on the right side effective. So White usually plays *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Kudo: The question is what happens when Black attaches at 1 in *Dia. 3*. If White comes in at 4 again, I guess Black plays 5 and 7.

Ishida: Because Black 7 at 'a' would be too timid.

Kudo: This is acceptable to Black. Black 1 may be playable.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Ishida: So in this case White has another choice; he can extend at 4 in *Dia. 4*. After 6 the marked white stone that Black was originally attacking has gotten settled, at least for the time being.

Kudo: The question will be easier to answer if we enlarge the diagram. Let's give Black a framework on the right side as in *Dia. 5*, for example. If Black plays 1 and 3, White will naturally play 4. If we assume the sequence through Black 7, Black's framework has been somewhat broken up.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Ishida: If Black is going for a large territory on the right side, then instead of 5 in *Dia. 5*, he'll block at 1 in *Dia. 6*.


Murakami: Isn't that joseki reserved for handicap games?

Ishida: Not at all. In this opening it's excellent.


Kudo: *Dia.* 5 and 6 both look playable.

Ishida: In *Dia.* 5, Black 'a' will be quite good.

Kudo: Let's compare this with *Dia.* 7. The moves through Black 7 in *Dia.* 7 are consistent with Black's large-scale strategy. This looks playable too.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Ishida: Very playable. Most likely White will choose to settle with 4 and 6 in *Dia.* 8.


Kudo: After which Black aims toward further attacks, like a diagonal contact play at 'a' or 'b'. This also looks playable.

Ishida: Rin Kaiho tends to attach against the weaker stone.

Kudo: Let's say both moves are possible.

Ishida: A non-statement that won't help sell this magazine.

Topic 2: Which way to push?



White 'a' or 'b'? What's the difference?

Murakami: The question here is whether White should push at 'a' or 'b' against Black 1. Textbooks usually say that White should push toward his extension.

Ishida: Meaning White 'a' in this situation, I guess.


Kudo: Rin often plays White 'b'. I once told him it was conventional wisdom that White should play 'a'. He said, 'Is that so?' He's joseki-illiterate.

Ishida: Even amateurs who know that White should play 'a' probably don't know why. Essentially, you mustn't push toward the side on which you can't afford to be blocked.


Kudo: After that explanation, they probably still don't know why.

Ishida: All right, suppose White pushes at 1 in *Dia.* 1 and slides to 3. If Black now blocks at 4, White's happy because the marked white stone is well positioned. But if White plays 1 and 3 in *Dia.* 2, Black 4 succeeds in taking control of unclaimed area. This is because White 1 pushed toward the side on which White doesn't want to be blocked. White 1 in *Dia.* 1 is correct.

Kudo: After Black 4 in *Dia.* 2, White will play 5. That's Rin's pattern.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2


Ishida: Since White has already extended at the marked stone, White 5 feels overconcentrated.

Kudo: Let's add that when White plays 3 in *Dia.* 3, Black should not jump to 4. That makes White 5 good. Let's also add that when White plays 1 correctly in *Dia.* 4, Black is not going to answer White 3 at 'a'. He'll jump to 4, naturally. So we should be comparing *Dia.* 2 with *Dia.*

4 and once again, it's difficult to say which is better.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Ishida: Yes, but I still wouldn't want to play White 1 in *Dia. 2* because it reminds me of the joseki in *Dia. 5*. Compare *Dias. 5* and 6. In *Dia. 6* Black's stronger, with the potential that Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c' and so on will make Black 'g' sente, and White has a deformed shape with less territory. Both may be joseki, but if I'm White, I want *Dia. 5*.


Kudo: But look, Black's stones in *Dia. 5* are a line farther to the left, so they have greater effect on the left side.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Ishida: I'm taking that into consideration. I think that if White plays 1 in *Dia. 7*, he should continue by jumping to 3. If Black plays 4, White will connect at 5 or push down at 'a'. Let's assume White 5 and Black 6. To me, this looks better for White than *Dia. 2*.

Kudo: Quite right.

Topic 3: Facing 3-4 points.



Is this game over?

Murakami: When White plays the 3-4 point at 2, you often see Black take the facing 3-4 point at 3. Kajiwara 9-dan once wrote that 'White 2 is bad. If Black plays 3, the game is over.'


Ishida: The game is not over.

Kudo: After Black 3, the idea is that if White plays 'a' Black will take the empty corner at 'b', but if White plays 'b' or thereabouts, Black will approach at 'c'.

Ishida: White can play 'a' or take the lower right corner; there's nothing wrong with either move.

Kudo: Kajiwara himself may not have believed what he wrote. Maybe I shouldn't have said that; I'll get mail from his readers.

Murakami: Still, if White plays 1 in *Dia. 1*, doesn't that let Black have three corners?




Dia. 1

Ishida: There's no proof that the 3-4 point is superior to the 5-3 point. White's at no disadvantage. Kato (Masao) plays this opening with White, and continues with White 3 to 13.

Murakami: That seems to leave White over-concentrated on the left side.


Ishida: So what, as long as he maintains the balance of territory?

Kudo: White can also play 1 in *Dia. 2*, taking the empty corner and letting Black approach at 2. That gives a reasonable game.




Dia. 2

Murakami: Now that we've heard your opinions of Kajiwara's theory, let me ask a related question. It's always been said that if Black approaches at 1 in *Dia. 3*, White should not approach at 2 because that makes Black 3 ideal. What about that?



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Ishida: The idea is not to let your opponent combine an extension with a pincer, but this is again a psychological matter.

Kudo: White frequently plays 2 at 'a' to avoid the pincer at Black 3.


Ishida: The high approach does weaken the effect of the pincer. Against White 'a' Black has pincers at 'b' and 'c', but the high approach is much less vulnerable to a pincer attack, because White can immediately escape to the outside.

Kudo: After *Dia. 3*, if White wants to get into trouble he can fight back directly with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*, inviting Black 4 and 6. In an active position like this, Black's first-move advantage is critical.


Ishida: That's an important point for amateurs to grasp, because they try to fight even where their opponents are stronger.

Murakami: Then what should White do after *Dia. 3*?

Ishida: You could consider *Dia. 5*, for example. White settles the corner in sente with 1 to 5, then plays 7 and 9.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Murakami: That does make the game more relaxed.

Ishida: White's three stones at the top and Black's three stones on the left side have similar shapes, and the four-stone black and white groups in the lower left corner are also about equal.

Murakami: That's very clear. So why is this supposed to be bad for White?


Kudo: That idea, and a lot of others, have come down to us from the days before komi.

Murakami: Even after all these years?

Ishida: The psychological factor may be fairly big. Black has various ways to attack in addition to 1 in *Dia. 6*, such as Black 'a', 'b', or

'c'. Against the pincer at 1, however, White doesn't have much choice except to play Dia. 5. Perhaps what White dislikes is giving Black so many ways to attack, although this may also be a question of individual style.

Topic 4: Concerning a famous joseki.




Even position?

Ishida: What are we supposed to say about this?

Murakami: This is an extremely well-known joseki. Which side is better?


Kudo: We can't possibly answer that question. All we can say is that it's playable for both sides.

Ishida: This may be a digression, but the question in this joseki is the arrangement of white stones on the left side. It's not so good if White has taken the two star points, for example, because Black's strong jump to the marked stone in *Dia. 1*, pointing toward White's two star points, sort of punctures White's large-scale strategy. It would be better to have the marked white stone on the three-three point at 'a'.




Dia. 1

Kudo: The star points aren't territorially oriented. When White plays the star points, he often uses the avalanche joseki with 2 and 4 in *Dia. 2* to start a fight.



Dia. 2

Ishida: Going back to the original topic, even when Black has closed the upper corner, in many recent games White has been playing the knight's-move approach instead of the one-space high approach. If Black answers at 2 in *Dia. 3*, White gets settled with 3 to 7.



Dia. 3


Murakami: The joseki we saw before. Is the idea that it's bad to allow Black the pincer at 2 another holdover from the pre-komi era?

Kudo: Next White extends at 9. This isn't bad for White at all.

Ishida: Black 2 is considered an ideal extension and pincer, but after White gets settled up to 7, Black 2 isn't optimally positioned. A less open extension to 'a' or 'b' would be better.

Kudo: But if Black played 2 at 'a' or 'b', White wouldn't make the diagonal contact play at 3.

Topic 5: Ideal shape, but what's it worth?



How big is Black's advantage?

Kudo: What have we here?

Murakami: Another well-known joseki.


Ishida: With a one-space enclosure in the corner above.

Murakami: The attraction of this joseki for Black is the power it gives him on the right side. Combine that with a one-space enclosure above and it becomes ideal.

Kudo: Yes, Black has a good formation.

Murakami: We want to know how good it is. Can White afford to allow this joseki?

Kudo: Apparently we're supposed to say that Black's formation only looks superior; that it's really a fair game.



Dia. 1


Ishida: White 13 is normally played at 1 in Dia. 1. Since Black has closed the corner we can assume that White has stones in the upper

and lower left, so Black can't connect with 2 at 'a' because the ladder at Black 6 doesn't work.

Murakami: We're aware of that. Let's get back to the topic.

Kudo: If you want to know whether Black is really ahead, let's play a little further, then get Ishida to make one of his lightning calculations.

Ishida: All right, let's start with White 1 in Dia. 2.



Dia. 2

Kudo: Then perhaps Black 2 to 6.

Ishida: Now we'd better surround, not invade.

Kudo: Yes, let's avoid invasions.


Ishida: Perhaps Black can surround at 12.

Kudo: And behold — territory!

Ishida: But White plays 13 and 15.

Kudo: Surely Black's in the lead.

Ishida: It's about 110 for Black, 100 for White. Let's try White 1 in Dia. 3.



Dia. 3

Kudo: Another possibility.

Ishida (after continuing through White 19):
What about this?

Kudo: Black may have a lead, but the game is far from decided.

Ishida: Play as you will, the only way to lose by a big margin would be to make a big mistake.

Kudo: Give me two extra points in compensation and I'll gladly play white.

Ishida: I'd want one more point than that.

Murakami: If we subtract the extra compensation, Black's two or three points ahead. So in the original diagram, Black does have a slight lead.

Ishida: At least you can say that Black will have to work hard to lose.


Kudo: Whereas White can lose quite easily.

Ishida: The main factor seems to be that Black's framework on the right side is very nearly secure territory. It's a bit difficult for White to invade.


Kudo: The bird-in-the-hand factor.

Murakami: To an amateur playing White, Black's framework looks like cause for total despair, but if it's a question of at most two points or so, White needn't get too excited.

Topic 6: Give me two points —



Dia. A



Dia. B

The difference between A and B.

Kudo: This discussion of two points of compensation reminds me of something I once proposed in a drinking situation. The small knight's move enclosure at Black 1 in *Dia. A* is standard, but how much worse is the diagonal move at Black 1 in *Dia. B*? How many points of compensation would that be equal to?

Ishida: You're suggesting that Black use 1 in *Dia. B* to bargain for extra compensation?

Kudo: I asked everyone present. Most people said that if you gave them two points

they'd willingly play the diagonal move.

Ishida: I'll second that.


Murakami: What about one point?

Kudo: That's harder to say, but if White can't afford to give two points, then the difference between the knight's move and diagonal move must be less than two points.


Ishida: This is going to ruin the sales of books on the opening.

Kudo: The diagonal move surrounds less territory than the knight's move, but it makes the corner stronger.

Ishida: In many cases it turns out to be hard to tell which will be better. Take *Dias. 1* and *2*, for example, where Black plays three moves in the top left corner. Normally the knight's-move enclosure in *Dia. 1* is considered better shape, but if Black starts fighting with 1 and 3, he prefers *Dia. 2*, because the marked black stone has a positive effect.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Murakami: White 'a' works differently in *Dias. 1* and *2*.


Ishida: *Dia. 3* is a similar story. The exchange of Black 1 and 3 for White 2 and 4 normally looks favorable to Black, but you can't tell which is better.

Kudo: White's solid; Black still doesn't have territory.


Ishida: And surrounding territory with Black 'a' is out of the question. What's definitely true is that if Black plays 1 at 'b' and White plays 'c', the result is even.

Kudo: It's also definitely true that if Black

has the marked extension in *Dia. 4*, White's better off playing this solidly. As a more extreme example, when Black plays 1 in *Dia. 5*, even if White extends two spaces to 2, there's a nagging doubt that Black may have had the worst of the exchange.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4


Ishida: What about the difference between *Dias. 6* and 7?



Dia. 5



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Kudo: Of course *Dia. 6* is better. Is this another compensation question?


Ishida: *Dia. 7* looks pretty bad to me.

Kudo: This is just a guess, but if you gave me two points again, I'd gladly play *Dia. 7*. I have a weakness for cash.

Ishida: The bird in the hand.

Kudo: Anyway, everyone makes a big fuss about one or two points in the opening, then chucks away five points in the endgame.

Topic 7: A question of taste.



Which do you prefer?

Murakami: The pattern from Black 1 to 13 on the left side is often seen. Cho and Kobayashi played it in a Meijin game a while ago, for example (Cho was White). The contrast is extremely clear, so perhaps we can discuss this.

Kudo: We can't possibly say which side is better.

Murakami: Then perhaps you'll tell us which side you prefer.

Kudo: I'll take Black. Since Black 13 is an extension from both the top and bottom, Black seems somehow to have gained a move.


Ishida: But I'll take White.

I guess it comes down to how you view the black territory on the left side — how secure you think it is. Let's also consider the shape in *Dia. 1*. I think Black 1 is a dull move. White is sure to attach at 2 and pull back at 4. Black does well only if White plays 2 at 6, letting Black attach at 'a', followed by White 'b' and Black 4.

Murakami: Are you saying that Black 1 is dull because it lets White get the large moves at 2 and 4?


Ishida: That's right.

Kudo: Still, there's no firm basis for all this. It's a question of taste.



Dia. 1

Topic 8: A one-line difference.




How much has White lost?

Murakami: This shape is often shown in joseki books and described as bad for White. Could you comment on the difference between this and *Dia. 1*?

Kudo: *Dia. 1* was played by Hashimoto Shoji 9-dan. The topic position is the same except that White 1 is at 'a'.

Murakami: Given that *Dia. 1* is a fair exchange, can it be so bad to move White 1 just one line up?




Dia. 1


Ishida: It certainly can. This isn't a matter of just a couple of points. How many points would you give to move White 1 to 'a'?

Kudo: About four points.

Ishida: To start with, there's a big difference in White's eye shape. Then there's the problem of Black 1 in *Dia. 2*; White can't close off the side. In *Dia. 3* Black can slide to 1 but White can contain Black in sente with the sequence from White 'a' to White 'e'.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Kudo: Also, the one-line difference makes a big difference in the influence toward the bottom.

Ishida: Incidentally, why does White play 7 in *Dia. 1*? I'd want to block at 1 in *Dia. 4*. After

Black 1 and White 2 in *Dia. 5*, Black can only cut at 3. White gives atari with 4 and 6. If Black connects, even if the ladder is off, I think White can do well enough by extending to 'a'.




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Kudo: I've seen games in which White played that way. It looks effective.

Murakami: Here's another question: when White presses at 1 in *Dia. 6*, it's common knowledge that Black should push once at 2, then jump to 4. But many amateurs feel uncomfortable about the gap at 'a' so they push once more at Black 1 in *Dia. 7* before jumping to 3.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Ishida: That's also pretty bad.

Kudo: The drawback of *Dia. 6* is the lack of resistance to a white attachment at 'b'. The drawback of *Dia. 7* is White's extra power on the outside. The question is which drawback is greater, and here conventional wisdom is right: *Dia. 7* is worse.

Ishida: In *Dia. 7*, after White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black will hane at 'd'. Compared with *Dia. 6*, the hane is one line farther down. Another point is that Black 'c' is stronger in *Dia. 6*, so White's options are more limited than in *Dia. 7*. Now let's ask Kudo how many points he would take —

Kudo: Give me two points and I'll play *Dia. 7*. I can't resist cash.

Continued on page 64.

Strange and Wonderful Shapes

Two Sequels

In GW50 we published an article on various unusual shapes. It concluded with the only known example from professional play of 'living with a false eye'. Not long after that article appeared, another example came up, and we have finally found space to present it. Strictly speaking, the term 'false eye' is a misnomer, since the group is alive, but the Japanese refer to it as *kake-me iki* (living with a false eye) because the shape approximates that of a false eye.

The same article dealt with an 'artificial' shape, 'eternal life' or *chosei*, which had been worked out by theoreticians but had never appeared in actual play. Well, it finally made its debut, in a game between two inseis at the Nihon Ki-in.

Below we take a look at both these unusual shapes.

1. Living with a False Eye

by Nakayama Noriyuki 5-dan




Figure 1 (1-50)

White: Hotta Seiji 4-dan

Black: Nakano Hironari 5-dan

An unusual shape appeared in a game played in the 1st preliminary round of the Honinbo title at the Central Japan headquarters of the Nihon Ki-in in 3 November 1988. The players were Nakano Hironari 5-dan and Hotta Seiji 4-dan. Nakano had been enjoy-

ing great form at the time of this game, but the indications are that he overlooked this life with a false eye, and Hotta scored a sweeping win.

Figure 1. The origin of the incident was in White's all-out move of 42. Black's aggressive attack of 45 and 47 climaxes the first act. Black hopes, with a bit of luck, to capture the whole group.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2. Figuring he can't make a game of it if he spends all his time fleeing, Hotta 4-dan leaves his large group and switches to 56. This all-out move makes Nakano 5-dan lose his temper.

Black is not simply attacking with the sequence from 57: he seems to be making a serious attempt to capture the group.

Black 79. If at A, Black can start a ko, but because White's group is so large, he can get plenty of ko threats, so Black can't win the ko fight. In any case, ko is not what Nakano wants.

Black sets out to deliver the coup de grace with 93, but around this stage Nakano is already laboring under a misapprehension. After the continuation to 100, the white group is alive. I would like the reader to think about it too before looking at the continuation. Once the game has come this far, it's simple.





Figure 3

31, 34: ko. Moves after 134 omitted.

Figure 3. When White connected at 4, Nakano was quite upset to find that the group was alive. Cutting at A is out of the question: White counters with B through White H.

Black was not able to cut at A, so the whole white group became linked up. That meant that even though White's eye was a 'false' one, the group was perfectly alive.

Since he had driven the white group into his own territory, this was no laughing matter for Black. All his play so far had become meaningless. Furiously he invaded White's moyo with 5, but Hotta answered peacefully up to 18: rich men don't pick fights. The best Nakano could do was to choose the path of an honourable defeat by starting a ko with 25.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1 is given to demonstrate that the white group is alive. Even if Black is allowed to fill in all the liberties in the bottom right corner, he can never put the white group into

atari. The two 'false' eyes are not only full-fledged eyes, they are also two points of territory.

There are various unusual shapes in go, such as triple ko, *chosei*, and 'living with false eyes, but we already have records of some 20 triple-ko games, so it can no longer be considered rare. I have only seen a 'false-eye' life once, in a game 20 years ago between Shinohara and Ishigure, so this is probably the second example in go history. That's why I wanted to put the game on the record. Incidentally, I haven't yet come across *chosei* in a game.

(Kido, January 1989)

2. Eternal Life

Ironically, an example of *chosei* or eternal life occurred, for what was probably the first time ever in go history, just over a month after the article by Nakayama given above was published. It came up in a game played between inseis on 28 January 1989. One of the players was Kurotaki Masanori, who made professional shodan in 1990 and who in 1991 became the first male shodan to beat a 9-dan in an even game (GW63, page 8). Kurotaki (born in July 1975) seems to have a knack for getting himself in the record books. He is a disciple of Oeda 8-dan. His opponent was Kono Mitsuki, a disciple of Sakata Eio. To see how the *chosei* arose, let's look at the game.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Black: Kurotaki; White: Kono




Figure 2 (51-100)




Figure 3 (101-147)

ko: 23, 26, 29, 32, 35; 45: takes two stones; 46: at 42; 47: at 43

Kono showed the game to his teacher, Sakata Eio, who commented: 'I agree with Kono's opinion that he would have won if he had played 10 in Figure 3 at 13. When 17 and 21 become sente, the game feels good for Black.'


Sakata then gave the following analysis of the *chosei*. White 36 is 1 in Dia. 1.

Dia. 1. Playing tenuki with 2 to end the centre ko is correct. When Black plays 6 in answer to 5, White 7 is essential, so the possibility of *chosei* arises. Next —


Dia. 2. Black 8 is a very clever and neces-

sary move. Anything else and White plays at 8, killing Black with the five-stone large-eye shape (gomoku-nakade). Next —


Dia. 3. White 9 is also necessary.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. After Black captures with 10 —

Dia. 5. White throws in at 11, so we get the same shape as in Dia. 1.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

Dia. 6. Black 12 gives the same shape as in Dia. 2. This is *chosei* or eternal life. According to the Nihon Ki-in rules then in effect, the game is declared 'no result' if neither player yields (the Nihon Ki-in rules have since been revised, but the game would still be 'no result' according to the rule forbidding whole-board repetition). After first confirming that neither player intended to yield, Nakamura Hidehito 9-dan, the insei instructor, declared the game was 'no result' and ordered a rematch.

Nakamura: 'Black would have been ahead if he had played ordinary endgame instead of making the *chosei* [that is, letting the black group die].'

Sakata: 'Actually with 6 in Dia. 1 Black

missed a move for making his group unconditionally alive.'

Dia. 7. Black should connect at 1. If White 2, Black 3 is another clever move. The best White can do is to capture at 'a', but now Black can enter at 'b'. Instead of 2 —

Dia. 8. If White 1, Black plays 2 and lives. White can't get a *gomoku-nakade*: Black can throw in below 1, then atari from above (this is the *oshi-tsubushi* technique). White can't even get a *seki*.


However, it was thanks to Kurotaki's oversight that *chosei* made its first appearance in a game, so it's just as well he went wrong.

Kurotaki: 'I didn't see Sakata Sensei's tesuji.


I didn't know whether I was winning or losing. I was astonished when it turned into a *chosei*.'

Just for the record, Kurotaki won the rematch.

(*Go Weekly*, February 1989)



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Conventional Wisdom: Right or Wrong?

Continued from page 60

Last Topic: Suggested by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan.



Corner and center: a difference in character.

Takemiya (who just happened to drop in at this point): Here you have the same pattern in the corner and the center. If it's Black's move, where should he connect: 'a' or 'b'?

Murakami: An interesting question.

Takemiya: Doesn't it look as if Black should play in the center?

Kudo: Does it?

Murakami: The corner gives more territory.

Ishida: I think Otake would play in the

center.


Takemiya: But Rin said he'd take the corner.

Ishida: A statement you'd expect from Rin.

Murakami: What would you say yourself?

Ishida: I don't know.

Kudo: About how many points is it worth to connect at Black 1 in *Dia. 1*?



Dia. 1

Takemiya: Rin said something about that too.

Ishida: Compared with White 1, at least forty points.

Takemiya: Forty points?

Kudo: Worth at least forty points compared with White 1 means that Black should win the game by at least twenty points. That seems reasonable.

Takemiya: Rin didn't go that far. He said about ten points.

Ishida: Ridiculous!

(*Kido*, January 1982. Translated by James Davies.)

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